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The Jefferson-D’Hondt method is one of the most popular ways for allocating parliamentary 
seats to party lists in proportional representation electoral systems (Colomer, 2004; Bormann 
& Golder, 2013; Carey, 2017).1 It was originally devised in 1792 by Thomas Jefferson to 
apportion seats in the U.S. House of Representatives among the states (Jefferson, 1792), and 
later it was proposed by a Belgian mathematician and lawyer Victor D’Hondt (D’Hondt,  
1882; 1885) for use in parliamentary elections.2 It is used to allocate all parliamentary seats 
in, inter alia, Albania, Argentina, Aruba, Belgium, Cape Verde, Chile, the Czech Republic, 
East Timor, Fiji, Finland, Greenland, Israel, Luxembourg, Macedonia, the Netherlands, 
Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, São Tome and Príncipe, Serbia, Spain, Suriname, 
Switzerland, and Turkey, as well as nearly all the seats in Croatia and Montenegro. It is also 
employed, in combination with other methods, in Austria, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, 
Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Japan, and had been historically used in, among others, Bulgaria, 
France, Germany, Italy, Moldova, Norway, and Sweden.3 
It is well known that the Jefferson-D’Hondt method is biased in favor of larger parties (see 
e.g., Humphreys, 1911; Huntington, 1921; 1928; 1931; Morse, Von Neumann & Eisenhart, 
1948; Rae, 1967; Taagepera & Laakso, 1980; Carstairs, 1980; Woodall, 1986; Taagepera & 
Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1990; Gallagher, 1991; Oyama & Ichimori 1995; Benoit, 2000; 
Balinski & Young, 2001: 72-74; Marshall, Olkin & Pukelsheim, 2002; van Eck et al., 2005; 
Pukelsheim, 2014). The magnitude of such bias has been estimated by Sainte-Laguë (1910), 
Pólya (1918a, 1918b, 1919a, 1919b, 1919c), Schuster et al. (2003), Schwingenschlögl & 
Drton (2004), Drton & Schwingenschlögl (2005), Schwingenschlögl (2008), Pukelsheim 
(2014), and Janson (2014). However, though earlier research focused on a single-district 
scenario, the majority of countries employing the Jefferson-D’Hondt method allocate seats 
within each of their multiple electoral districts separately, with the most notable exceptions 
being Israel and the Netherlands. In those countries, the political effects of the advantage 
provided by the Jefferson-D’Hondt method to larger parties can only be assessed on the 
national scale, when looking at the composition of the legislature as a whole.4 
                                                 
1 The Jefferson-D’Hondt method is also known as the Hagenbach-Bischoff method (Szpiro, 2010: 204), the 
method of greatest divisors (Huntington, 1921; 1928; 1931), the method of highest averages (Carstairs, 1980: 
17-19), and the method of rejected fractions (Chafee, 1929). In Israel the method is called the Bader-Ofer system 
after two members of the Knesset who proposed it in 1975: Yohanan Bader, an eminent alumnus of the authors’ 
Alma Mater, and Avraham Ofer. 
2 In fact, the method was also rediscovered by several authors in various contexts between 1860 and 1874, see 
Mora (2013: 6) for details. Dančišin (2013b) discusses the evolution of D’Hondt’s ideas on the subject of 
proportional representation and the origins of his method. 
3 The Jefferson-D’Hondt method is also employed to allocate European Parliamentary seats in a majority of 
the EU member states (Poptcheva 2016), as well as at the regional and local level in a number of countries. 
4 Pukelsheim (2017: 133) noted that seat biases scale with the number of districts, but stopped short of providing 
an explicit summation formula. Of course, he has been primarily concerned with an expected seat bias of the 𝑘-th 
largest party, rather than a seat bias of a party whose vote share is fixed. Unless one assumes that the distribution 
of party vote shares on the probability simplex is so highly concentrated that the order of parties is the same in 
every district (an assumption that fails to match empirical data), a simple summation of the expected biases over 
districts will not produce a nationwide seat bias. 
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Drawing on earlier works by Janson (2014) and Pukelsheim (2014), we develop here a new 
formula for estimating seat allocation that depends solely on nationwide electoral results and 
the fixed parameters of the electoral system. We show that the number of seats for the i-th 
party (𝑠𝑖) is given by the seat allocation formula: 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑠 + 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑛2 − 𝑐2 , (0.1) 
where 𝑝𝑖 is the renormalized share of votes cast for that party, 𝑠 – the total number of seats, 
𝑐 – the number of electoral districts, and 𝑛 – the renormalized number of parties, i.e., the 
number of “relevant” parties determined in accordance with the procedure described in 
Sec. 3.3. This formula is exact if the five underlying assumptions discussed in Sec. 1.2 are 
fully satisfied, and it provides an approximation if they are only approximately satisfied. Note 
also that this formula is not a simple consequence of the asymptotic results valid for a single 
district, but requires different assumptions and justifications. 
Metaphorically, the formula can be thought of in terms of a potluck:5 each party provides 
a contribution of equal value to the common bounty pot (averaging to half a seat per district, 
that is 𝑐 2⁄ ). But when the pot is later divided among the parties, the size of the bounty is 
proportional to the ladle, namely its (renormalized) share of the overall number of votes (𝑝𝑖).6 
Accordingly, small parties are disadvantaged, since they contribute more than they get back 
from the pot, while large parties receive a bonus. What the formula does make clear, however, 
is that the size of that bonus depends not only on the size of the ladle, but also on the size of 
the bounty pot (𝑐𝑛 2⁄ ). This is, in fact, the basic mechanism the formula reveals: the party 
bonus created by the D’Hondt system is a function of both the number of districts and of the 
number of parties. 
While for the political practitioners the number of seats is the key magnitude of interest, 
scholars have traditionally thought of electoral systems in terms of seat shares (𝑞𝑖 ≔ 𝑠𝑖/𝑠), 
which are, inter alia, more suitable for international comparisons. In that case, it can be easier 
to substitute for the number of seats and the number of districts a single variable, the mean 
district magnitude (𝑚 ≔ 𝑠/𝑐) and to express the formula in the following manner: 
𝑞𝑖 = �1 + 𝑛2𝑚�𝑝𝑖 − 12𝑚 , (0.2) 
underscoring the linear (affine) dependence between the seat shares and the vote shares. 
Hence, the difference between the seat share and the vote share is the seat bias for the i-th 
party (Δ𝑖 ≔ 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖) given by the following formula: 
Δ𝑖 = 𝑛2𝑚 ⋅ �𝑝𝑖 − 1𝑛� . (0.3) 
                                                 
5 Or Jacob’s join, for those of our readers who are from Lancashire, see Crosby (2000). 
6 See Janson (2014: Remark 3.9) for a similar heuristic for 𝑐 = 1. 
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Since the sign of the bias is determined by its last factor, the difference between the party’s 
vote share and the mean vote share, it is evident that whether a party stands to gain or lose 
from the D’Hondt formula depends on its vote share being above or below the mean. It is 
likewise evident that the system is neutral (i.e., Δ𝑖 = 0) only towards those parties for which 
𝑝𝑖 = 1 𝑛⁄ . Such parties receive exactly the number of seats corresponding to their vote shares. 
In addition to explaining the magnitude of the nationwide bias for the winning parties, the 
formulae have a purely practical application. The Jefferson-D’Hondt method requires that 
district-level results should be known, and as all divisor methods can be sensitive to small 
variations in vote shares, those results have to be known exactly. By contrast, our formula 
provides a surprisingly good prediction of the nationwide seat allocation (with accuracy 
within 1.5% of the national seat total for more than 94.0% of parties for the analyzed data 
from eight countries) while requiring only aggregate party vote shares to be known. Hence, it 
can be used to accurately model seat allocation on the basis of opinion polls, exit polls, and 
preliminary election results, when aggregate vote shares are usually all that is known.7 
The model can be also applied to detect gerrymandering in electoral systems employing 
Jefferson-d’Hondt method. In fact, it generalizes and extends the McGhee-Stephanopoulos 
efficiency gap test (McGhee, 2014; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, 2015), currently one of the 
most prominent methods for detecting gerrymandering in two-party FPTP systems, in three 
aspects: it allows for relaxation of a restrictive assumption that the turnout is equal across all 
districts and it permits the test to be applied to multiparty systems, as well as to systems with 
multimember districts. 
The proposed model has several additional potential applications. It can be useful for 
calculating political strategies (e.g., for estimating consolidation benefits or secession losses). 
It can also provide a simple method for estimating the effects of changes in electoral system 
parameters (particularly the number of seats and the number of districts) on particular parties, 
as well as on general systemic incentives. 
In Sec. 1 of this paper we discuss the basic features and assumptions of the proposed formula, 
demonstrating how it fits into earlier literature on the subject and where it introduces new 
findings. In Sec. 2, we analyze actual data from eight European countries to demonstrate that 
the formula provides a reasonably accurate estimate of actual seat allocation results and is 
quite robust against minor violations of the assumptions. In Sec. 3 we focus on the connection 
between the mathematical basis of the Jefferson-D’Hondt seat allocation method and our 
formula, explaining how the latter can be derived from the former. In particular, we discuss at 
which stages the assumptions formulated in Sec. 1 are employed. Finally, in Sec. 0 we explore 
the political consequences of the seat bias formula. Moreover, we examine possible 
applications of the formula to single-member systems, as well as the generalization of the 
McGhee-Stephanopoulos efficiency gap test mentioned above. In addition, in Appendix A we 
quantify and analyze the sources of approximation error in the formula that arises when the 
                                                 
7 For earlier attempts to estimate seat allocations on the basis of nationwide polls, see, e.g., Pavia & García-
Cárceles (2016) and Udina & Delicado (2005). It should be noted, however, that those prior works approach the 
problem from an entirely different perspective, attempting to fit a statistical model to data (a task heavily reliant 
on overt and latent distributional assumptions), while we seek to derive a theoretical model from the Jefferson-
D’Hondt method itself and use the empirical data only for test purposes. 
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assumptions given in Sec. 1.2 are partially violated, and in Appendix B we discuss in more 
depth the two technical assumptions and demonstrate why they seem to be less restrictive than 
the ones made in prior works. 
All parts of the article are designed to be sufficiently independent of each other to permit 
the reader to skip immediately to the one they are interested in. 
1. Basic features and assumptions 
1.1. Seat bias under the Jefferson-D’Hondt method 
The Jefferson method’s bias in favor of larger parties had already been recognized in the 
context of congressional apportionment discussions long before Victor D’Hondt introduced 
(or rather reinvented) it as a method for allocating seats among parties in the context of 
proportional representation systems (Balinski & Young, 2001: 23-24; Pukelsheim, 2017: 
323-324), but Sainte-Laguë (1910) was the first to quantify this effect, finding its expected 
value to equal ln 2 − 1 2⁄  seats under the assumption that the ratio of the smaller-party vote 
count to larger-party vote count is uniformly distributed over (0,1). Pólya (1918a, 1918b, 
1919a, 1919b, 1919c), assuming instead a uniform distribution of party vote shares over 
the probability simplex, employed geometric approach to calculate expected seat biases for 
three-party elections. This line of research has been continued by Schuster et al. (2003), 
Schwingenschlögl & Drton (2004), Drton & Schwingenschlögl (2005), and Schwingenschlögl 
(2008), who provide expected seat biases for the 𝑘-th largest party in an 𝑛-party election.8 
However, one is frequently interested in estimating expected seat bias for a specific party 
(characterized by a given vote share) rather than for an average 𝑘-th largest party. Moreover, 
the latter problem necessarily involves difficulties related to the choice of appropriate 
distributional assumptions. 
Analytic formulae expressing single-district seat bias as a function of a party’s vote share 
have been proposed by Bochsler (2010), Janson (2014), and Pukelsheim (2014). Prima facie, 
they appear identical to each other and match our seat bias formula for 𝑐 = 1. However, 
despite those similarities, they address different problems and employ different assumptions. 
Under the assumption that the votes shares follow an arbitrary absolutely continuous 
distribution over the probability simplex, Pukelsheim (2014: Sec. 6.10) has proven that the 
rounding residuals, i.e., the quantities that are discarded when dividing a party’s number of 
votes by the Jefferson-D’Hondt divisor and rounding down to full seats, converge in 
distribution to a vector of 𝑛 variables drawn from a uniform distribution and stochastically 
independent of each other and of the party vote shares as the number of seats 𝑠 approaches 
infinity.9 Hence he has deduced (Pukelsheim, 2014: Sec. 7.3), that the seat biases approaches 
those given by (0.3) (with 𝑐 = 1) in this case. Janson (2014: Theorem 3.4) has shown that for 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that their results for expected seat bias for the 𝑘-th largest party (obtained under the 
assumption that vote share vectors are drawn from the uniform distribution on the unit simplex) match exactly 
the results produced by our seat bias formula when 𝑝𝑖 equals the expected vote share of the 𝑘-th largest party. 
9 The proof is a more general case of an earlier proof by Tukey (1938), who established that the rounding 
residuals of a scalar variable converge in distribution to a uniform distribution on (0,1). See also Heinrich, 
Pukelsheim & Schwingenschlögl (2004). 
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any choice of votes shares (under the mild assumption that they are linearly independent over 
rationals), the mean seat biases for the number of seats being randomly drawn from the 
uniform distribution on {1, … , 𝑆} also approach those given by (0.3) (again with 𝑐 = 1) as 
𝑆 tends to infinity. Bochsler (2010: p. 621) has obtained the single-district mean seat bias 
formula by assuming that the rounding residuals are independent of that party’s vote share and 
always have an expected value of 1/2. 
While all three cited works significantly advanced our knowledge of seat biases, they share 
a common limitation. The single-district formulae described by their authors are only correct 
in an asymptotic sense – as the district magnitude approaches infinity. Moreover, numerical 
simulations demonstrate that the rate of convergence in some of the theorems on which the 
authors rely is sufficiently slow as to render them of limited usefulness in those real-life 
electoral systems where the district magnitude is typically on the order of 3 to 30 seats (and, 
as we discuss in more detail in Sec. 0, it is exactly there that the magnitude of seat biases is 
most significant). It is primarily in the area described that we seek to advance prior knowledge 
by demonstrating that when seat allocations and seat biases are summed over multiple 
districts, restrictive assumptions about the rounding residuals on which Bochsler, Janson, and 
Pukelsheim rely can be exchanged for more liberal ones, dealing only with inter- and intra-
district averages (which converge to 1/2 far more rapidly). 
While our formulae are superficially similar to the those obtained by Janson, Pukelsheim, and 
Bochsler, they are not merely generalizations of the latter three to the multi-district case. 
Indeed, the difference is one of kind. First, our formulae are deterministic rather than 
probabilistic: if the five assumptions described in the following section are exactly satisfied, 
they yield the exact rather than just the expected values of the seat allocation, seat share, and 
seat bias. If the assumptions do not hold, the formulae are not guaranteed to work at all, but in 
Sec. 2 we demonstrate that in a number of real-life elections they still provide a reasonably 
good approximation of the empirical results. Second, our formulae rely on rather different 
assumptions. Janson and Pukelsheim both effectively assume that there is only one district, 
but its magnitude approaches infinity,10 while we do not require the district magnitude even to 
be large, though our assumption A5 involves averaging over districts and thereby relies on the 
law of large numbers, working better when the number of districts is substantial. 
1.2. Assumptions 
The five assumptions discussed in this subsection (the first three of which are essentially 
political and the latter two – technical) are sufficient for the seat allocation and seat bias 
formulae to produce exact results. Note that in this case it can be shown that the right hand 
side of formula (0.1) yields an integer number of seats. Otherwise, the formulae provide only 
an approximation. 
Technically, we define the set of relevant parties as the set of those parties that exceed both 
the relevant statutory thresholds (if any) and the mean natural threshold, defined in Sec. 3.3 
                                                 
10 Technically, Janson treats the district magnitude as randomly drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on (0, 𝑆), with 𝑆 approaching infinity. But in such case the expected district magnitude also approaches infinity, 
while the probability of the district magnitude being equal or smaller than some 𝑥 > 0 (i.e., the value of its 
cumulative distribution function) approaches 0 for every 𝑥. 
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below. The renormalized number of parties 𝑛 that appears in the seat allocation and seat bias 
formulae is the cardinality of that set. Moreover, by “the rounding residuals” we mean the 
quantities that are discarded when dividing each relevant party’s vote share by the Jefferson-
D’Hondt divisor and rounding down, see Sec. 3.1. 
The five assumptions are as follows: 
A1 
parties that are too small to be relevant in the above sense are allocated no seats 
in every electoral district; 
A2 
renormalized party vote shares11 are not correlated with district size measured 
by the sum of votes cast for relevant parties; 
A3 
renormalized party vote shares are not correlated with district magnitude 
measured by the total number of seats; 
A4 in each district the rounding residuals average to 1/2 over all relevant parties; 
A5 for each relevant party the rounding residuals average to 1/2 over all districts. 
Assumption A1 is potentially most troublesome, in the sense that its violations cannot be 
easily remedied. Such violations can occur in two instances. 
1) First, if the electoral support of some parties is highly concentrated in a number of 
districts small enough that the nationwide vote share is insufficient for those parties to 
be included in the set of relevant parties. The most extreme example of the former case 
occurs where one or more parties are regional in character (for instance because they 
represent a national or ethnic minority) and register party lists only in a single region, 
but win a non-zero number of seats therein. Such parties are a permanent fixture of 
political environments in such countries as Spain, Finland, or Croatia. The solution to 
this problem consists of employing a regional correction, which envisages estimating 
regional party votes shares on the basis of nationwide results and then applying the 
formula to each region separately, see Sec. 1.3. 
2) Second, if the variances in district magnitude translate into such variances in natural 
thresholds that parties too small to be qualify for seat allocation in an average-sized 
district nevertheless gain seats in the larger ones. For instance, in Spain the average 
district magnitude is ca. 6.73 seats, but (as of the last election) 36 seats have been 
allocated in the Madrid district and 31 seats – in the Barcelona district. Accordingly, 
outside the capital the best threshold estimate (see Taagepera, 2002) is at ca. 10.48% 
of the votes, while in Madrid it is more than five times smaller – just ca. 2.02%. For 
a recent discussion of this effect and its political consequences, see Barceló and 
Muraoka (2018). 
Assumptions A2 and A3 are fairly intuitive and we would expect them to be approximately 
satisfied in most real-life elections, except in two cases (both of which apply only to 
assumption A2): if one party’s vote share is highly correlated with turnout at the level of 
                                                 
11 By renormalized vote share of the 𝑖-th party in the 𝑘-th district (𝑝𝑖𝑘), we mean here the ratio of that party’s vote 
count (𝑣𝑖𝑘) and the sum of votes cast for all relevant parties (𝑣𝑘). 
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electoral district or with aggregate support for the unrepresented parties. A major violation of 
both A2 and A3 would likely be indicative of some form of gerrymandering (or at least a non-
intentional partisan bias). Smaller violations occur in some countries, such as Spain, for the 
parties whose support is highly concentrated in the urban areas, which are also the largest 
electoral districts both in terms of size and magnitude. 
Assumptions A4 and A5 are probably the least intuitive ones. At first glance they resemble 
the restrictive assumptions of the single-district formulae and, in fact, if 𝑐 = 1 assumption A5 
is equivalent to the assumption underlying Bochsler (2010). However, averaging the rounding 
residuals over parties (in the case of A4) or over districts (in the case of A5) leads, both 
empirically and theoretically, at least for distributions that are reasonably good 
approximations of real-life vote share distributions, to quantities close to 1/2. Assumption A4 
is equivalent to the assumption that the Jefferson-D’Hondt divisor equals the Gfeller-Joachim 
quota, which has been shown by Happacher & Pukelsheim (1996) to be asymptotically 
optimal in the sense of generating the smallest discrepancy from the desired number of seats, 
see Sec. 3.1. We reserve more detailed discussion of assumption A5 for Appendix B. Note 
that an empirical analysis of those two assumptions shows that A4 is a much smaller source of 
error than A5, which is the single largest source of error in the entire formula, see 
Appendix A. 
1.3. Regional correction 
As noted in connection with assumption A1, regional parties pose a significant problem in 
applying the seat allocation formula, as all of their votes are concentrated in a small number of 
districts. Accordingly, their nationwide vote shares are a poor approximation of their actual 
level of support in those districts, leading to such errors as eliminating them from the set of 
relevant parties due to being too small to cross the natural threshold, thereby misallocating all 
their seats to non-regional parties. If exact regional vote shares are known, for instance, 
because separate polls are held for regions with strong local parties, as is usually the case in 
Spain, this can be entirely avoided by applying the seat allocation formula for each region 
independently and then summing over all the regions. However, even if no such data are 
available, seat allocations can still be estimated on the basis of the nationwide distribution of 
party votes, provided that it is already known before the election which parties contest which 
districts and that certain additional assumptions discussed below hold. 
Let a party that contests less than a majority of all districts be a “regional party,” and let other 
parties be “national parties.” Let a set of districts contested by a given regional party be 
a “region.” For technical reasons, we will treat the set of districts with no regional parties as 
another region. Using those terms, we can express the assumptions for the regional correction 
as follows: 
R1 there is no partial overlap between any regions; 
R2 
the voters-to-seats ratio does not vary between regions (i.e., there is no 
interregional malapportionment); 
R3 relative size of the national parties (i.e., the ratios of their respective vote 
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shares) does not vary between regions. 
Of those, assumptions R1 and R2 sound natural (although R1 can be quite restrictive – for 
instance, it prevents the regional correction from being applied in Belgium, as the Flemish and 
Walloon regions overlap in Brussels). R3 is less obvious, but the effects of its violations tend 
to partially cancel each other when nationwide seat allocations are considered. 
The main premise of the regional correction is the fact that if the votes of a regional party 𝑖 
are entirely concentrated in a single region 𝑟 (per R1) then we can express its regional vote 
share as simply 
𝑃𝑖
𝑟 ∶= 𝑃𝑖 𝑣𝑣𝑟 = 𝑃𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑟  , (1.1) 
where 𝑃𝑖 is the 𝑖-th party nationwide vote share and 𝑃𝑖𝑟 is its regional vote share (both are non-
renormalized). Of course, for regional vote shares to sum up to 1, vote shares of the national 
parties need to be rescaled (per R3) to 
𝑃𝑗
𝑟 ∶= 𝑃𝑗 1 −∑ 𝑃𝑙𝑟𝑙∈𝑅𝑟1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑙𝑙∈𝑅 , (1.2) 
where 𝑅 is the set of all regional parties and 𝑅𝑟 is the set of regional parties running in region 
𝑟. In the region with no regional parties, this will simplify to 
𝑃𝑗
0 ∶= 𝑃𝑗1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑙𝑙∈𝑅 . (1.3) 
With those approximations of regional vote shares, as well as exact data on the number of 
seats and districts within each region, the seat allocation formula can be applied for each 
region without any further modifications. 
2. Empirical test 
As noted above, the Jefferson-D’Hondt method is used in numerous electoral systems around 
the world. Due to data availability and length constraints, we restrict ourselves to a limited 
subset of cases that meet the following criteria: 
1) Post-1945 national lower house elections… 
2) … in the EU member states… 
3) … with national (rather than fragmented) party systems… 
4) … and electoral systems based on multi-member districts (average district magnitude 
greater than 1)… 
5) … where the Jefferson-D’Hondt method is used to allocate all seats… 
6) … and continues to apply as of October 2018. 
There are seven countries that fully satisfy those criteria: the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. We also include Croatia, although 
it does not fully satisfy criterion (4): it uses the FPTP method to allocate seats in special 
districts set aside for ethnic minorities. However, the number of those minority seats is 
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relatively small in comparison to the size of the Croatian parliament (6 out of ca. 150) and 
elections for those seats are held at different dates, so we shall simply omit them from our 
calculations. We do not include Belgium, given its use of multitier elections in the Brussels 
region, but also given its absence of a nationwide party system (our formula would have to be 
applied separately for Flanders and Wallonia). For Finland, we omit elections prior to 2003 
due to the fact that the available data sets do not include information about the use of 
apparentments. 
For elections before 2007, we have obtained our data from the Global Election Database 
(Brancati, 2007). For subsequent elections, we have used the Constituency-Level Elections 
Archive (Kollman et al., 2017) and the web sites of the respective national electoral 
authorities. Table 1 sets forth the general electoral system parameters of the countries 
discussed above: 
Table 1. General parameters of electoral systems of the test country data set. 
Country 
Earliest 
election 
included 
Number of 
elections 
Number of 
seats (s) 
Number of 
districts (c) 
Number of relevant 
parties (n) 
national regional 
Croatia 2000 6 143-146 11 4-8 0-2 
Czech Republic 2002 5 200 14 4-9 0 
Finland 2003 4 200 13-15 7-8 1 
Luxembourg 1945 16 26-64 2-4 4-8 0-1 
Netherlands 1948 21 100-150 1 7-14 0 
Poland 2005 4 460 41 4-6 1 
Portugal 1975 15 230-263 22-24 4-6 0 
Spain 1977 13 350 52 3-6 5-10 
In five of those eight countries there have been at least a few regional parties that managed to 
win parliamentary seats, such as the Convergence and Union (CiU), the Republican Left of 
Catalonia (ERC), the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ / PNV), and many others in Spain, the 
Swedish People’s Party (SFP / RKP) in Finland, the Croatian Democratic Alliance of 
Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB) and the Istrian Democratic Party (IDS) in Croatia, the 
German Minority (MN) in Poland, the Independent Democratic Association of Macau in 
Portugal in 1975, or the Party of Independents of the East in Luxembourg in 1945. 
Accordingly, in those cases we employ the regional correction. 
To test the accuracy of the seat allocation formula (if it is found accurate, the accuracy of the 
seat bias formula necessarily follows), we have compared actual seat allocation with the 
results yielded by formula (0.1), with regional correction if necessary. For further comparison, 
we have also included the results obtained by the “naïve proportional” seat allocation, i.e., by 
allocating to 𝑖-th party exactly 𝑝𝑖 times 𝑠 seats, without accounting for the rounding effects, 
the district magnitude variations, and the bias in favor of larger parties, as well as results 
obtained by employing the modified cube law for proportional elections (Taagepera, 1986)12. 
Table 2 sets forth the results for the most recent elections in the eight test countries. 
                                                 
12 Under Taagepera’s modified cube law for proportional elections, the expected number of seats of i-th party 
equals 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠 𝑝𝑖𝑥 (𝑝𝑖𝑥 + (𝑁 − 1)1−𝑥(1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑥)⁄ , where 𝑥 ∶= (log𝑣 log 𝑠⁄ )1/𝑚 and 𝑁 is the effective number of 
parties, i.e., 𝑁 ≔ (∑ 𝑝𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 )−1. 
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Table 2. Comparison of predicted and actual seat allocations in most recent parliamentary elections in eight European 
countries (with regional corrections when necessary). 
 s c n13 party
14 pi si 
formula 
allocation 
naïve pro-
portionality 
modified 
cube law 
seats error seats error seats error 
Cr
oa
tia
 
20
16
 
143 11 5 
HDZ 38.95% 61 61.8 0.8 55.7 -5.3 57.2 -3.8 
NK 35.64% 54 56.1 2.1 51.0 -3.0 51.9 -2.1 
MOST 10.48% 13 12.6 -0.4 15.0 2.0 13.4 0.4 
ZIVI ZID 6.56% 8 5.8 -2.2 9.4 1.4 8.0 -0.0 
BM 365 4.31% 2 2.0 -0.0 6.2 4.2 5.0 3.0 
NL-Zeljko 0.31% 1 0.0 -1.0 0.4 -0.6 0.2 -0.8 
IDS 2.42% 3 3.0 -0.0 3.5 0.5 3.0 -0.0 
HDSSB 1.32% 1 1.6 0.6 1.9 0.9 1.9 0.9 
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 
20
17
 
200 14 9 
ANO 31.62% 78 76.2 -1.8 63.2 -14.8 66.2 -11.8 
ODS 12.08% 25 24.8 -0.2 24.2 -0.8 23.6 -1.4 
Pirati 11.52% 22 23.3 1.3 23.0 1.0 22.4 0.4 
SPD 11.35% 22 22.9 0.9 22.7 0.7 22.1 0.1 
KSCM 8.29% 15 14.8 -0.2 16.6 1.6 15.7 0.7 
CSSD 7.76% 15 13.4 -1.6 15.5 0.5 14.6 -0.4 
KDU-CSL 6.19% 10 9.3 -0.7 12.4 2.4 11.4 1.4 
TOP 09 5.67% 7 7.9 0.9 11.3 4.3 10.4 3.4 
STAN 5.53% 6 7.5 1.5 11.1 5.1 10.1 4.1 
Fi
nl
an
d 
20
15
 
200 13 8 
Center 21.44% 49 47.4 -1.6 42.9 -6.1 44.3 -4.7 
NCP 18.49% 37 40.0 3.0 37.0 0.0 37.8 0.8 
True Finns 17.93% 38 38.6 0.6 35.9 -2.1 36.5 -1.5 
SDP 16.78% 34 35.7 1.7 33.6 -0.4 34.0 0.0 
Greens 8.67% 15 15.3 0.3 17.3 2.3 16.7 1.7 
Left 7.25% 12 11.7 -0.3 14.5 2.5 13.7 1.7 
Ch. Dem. 3.60% 5 2.5 -2.5 7.2 2.2 6.4 1.4 
Aland 0.92% 1 1.0 0.0 1.8 0.8 1.5 0.5 
Swedes 4.91% 9 8.8 -0.2 9.8 0.8 9.4 0.4 
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g 
20
13
 
60 4 7 
CSV 35.15% 23 24.0 1.0 20.9 -2.1 21.7 -1.3 
LSAP 19.83% 13 12.7 -0.3 12.6 -0.4 12.5 -0.5 
DP 19.70% 13 12.6 -0.4 11.3 -1.7 11.1 -1.9 
Dei Greng 10.65% 6 5.9 -0.1 6.3 0.3 5.8 -0.2 
ADR 7.00% 3 3.2 0.2 4.1 1.1 3.7 0.7 
Dei Lenk 4.61% 2 1.4 -0.6 3.1 1.1 2.7 0.7 
Piratepart. 3.05% 0 0.3 0.3 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
20
17
 
150 1 13 
VVD 21.62% 33 33.3 0.3 32.4 -0.6 32.6 -0.4 
PVV 13.26% 20 20.3 0.3 19.9 -0.1 19.9 -0.1 
CDA 12.57% 19 19.2 0.2 18.9 -0.1 18.9 -0.1 
D66 12.42% 19 18.9 -0.1 18.6 -0.4 18.6 -0.4 
GrLinks 9.27% 14 14.0 0.0 13.9 -0.1 13.9 -0.1 
SP 9.23% 14 13.9 -0.1 13.8 -0.2 13.8 -0.2 
PvdA 5.79% 9 8.6 -0.4 8.7 -0.3 8.6 -0.4 
CU 3.44% 5 4.9 -0.1 5.2 0.2 5.1 0.1 
PvdD 3.24% 5 4.6 -0.4 4.9 -0.1 4.8 -0.2 
                                                 
13 Without regional parties. 
14 Regional parties are in shaded rows. 
~ 11 ~ 
 
50PLUS 3.16% 4 4.4 0.4 4.7 0.7 4.7 0.7 
SGP 2.11% 3 2.8 -0.2 3.2 0.2 3.1 0.1 
DENK 2.09% 3 2.8 -0.2 3.1 0.1 3.1 0.1 
FvD 1.81% 2 2.3 0.3 2.7 0.7 2.7 0.7 
Po
la
nd
 
20
15
 
460 41 5 
PiS 45.06% 235 233.1 -1.9 207.3 -27.7 213.6 -21.4 
PO 28.89% 138 142.1 4.1 132.9 -5.1 132.0 -6.0 
Kukiz 15 10.56% 42 38.9 -3.1 48.6 6.6 43.4 1.4 
Nowoczes. 9.12% 28 30.8 2.8 41.9 13.9 36.9 8.9 
PSL 6.15% 16 14.1 -1.9 28.3 12.3 23.9 7.9 
MN 0.22% 1 0.9 -0.1 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Po
rt
ug
al
 
20
15
 
230 22 4 
PSD/CDS 43.05% 107 106.9 -0.1 99.0 -8.0 101.3 -5.7 
PSoc 36.27% 86 88.4 2.4 83.4 -2.6 84.0 -2.0 
BlocEsq 11.43% 19 20.3 1.3 26.3 7.3 23.1 4.1 
PCP-PEV 9.25% 17 14.3 -2.7 21.3 4.3 18.2 1.2 
PAN 1.56% 1 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 
Sp
ai
n 
20
16
 
350 52 4 
PP 34.11% 137 132.2 -4.8 119.4 -17.6 126.3 -10.7 
PSOE 23.38% 85 82.4 -2.6 81.8 -3.2 80.7 -4.3 
Podemos 21.85% 71 75.3 4.3 76.5 5.5 74.4 3.4 
C's 13.49% 32 36.6 4.6 47.2 15.2 41.4 9.4 
ERC 1.23% 5 5.0 0.0 4.3 -0.7 4.7 -0.3 
CDC (DL) 2.72% 9 9.0 0.0 9.5 0.5 8.8 -0.2 
PNV 2.08% 8 6.4 -1.6 7.3 -0.7 6.5 -1.5 
EH Bildu 0.79% 2 2.5 0.5 2.8 0.8 2.7 0.7 
CC 0.34% 1 0.6 -0.4 1.2 0.2 0.9 -0.1 
It is immediately apparent that in all countries bar the Netherlands the proposed formula 
produces a much better approximation of the final result than the “naïve proportionality” 
approach (in the Netherlands both formulae produce very small errors). Indeed, only in 10 
cases out of 66 did our formula’s margin of error exceed 1% of the national seat total. This is 
despite quite significant deviations from assumptions A2 and A3 (see Appendix A). In most 
cases (46 out of 66) it also provides a better approximation than the modified cube law, and in 
a further 6 cases both approximations are equally good (within a rounding error). 
Eight elections and sixty-six parties is still a rather small sample to establish a claim of 
empirical validity. For this reason, we have repeated the test for all available elections from 
our eight test countries. To keep the length of this article within the bounds of reasonableness, 
we do not present the full results for each party. Instead, for each country we have computed 
two measures of error: the Loosemore-Hanby index (Loosemore & Hanby, 1971): 
𝐿𝐻 ≔
12� |𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑐𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖|𝑛𝑖=1 ; (2.1) 
the Bhattacharyya angle between the actual and estimated seat vectors (Bhattacharyya, 1943): 
𝐵𝐴 ≔ arc cos� �𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑐𝑡
𝑠
∙
𝑠𝑖
𝑠
�
1/2𝑛
𝑖=1
, (2.2) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑐𝑡 is the number of seats awarded to the i-th party under the actual allocation. Table 3 
sets forth the values of the error measure for successive elections. 
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Table 3. Aggregate errors for post-1945 parliamentary elections in eight European countries. 
country year s c n 15 
aggregate error mod. cube law error 16 
𝑩𝑨 𝑳𝑯 𝑳𝑯 𝒔⁄  𝑳𝑯 𝑳𝑯 𝒔⁄  
Croatia 2000 146 11 4 0.025 1.55 1.1% 2.62 1.8% 
Croatia 2003 144 11 7 0.034 2.32 1.6% 10.81 7.5% 
Croatia 2007 145 11 6 0.052 2.42 1.7% 12.30 8.5% 
Croatia 2011 143 11 6 0.174 4.39 3.1% 7.50 5.2% 
Croatia 2015 143 11 5 0.106 2.60 1.8% 8.02 5.6% 
Croatia 2016 143 11 5 0.094 3.62 2.5% 5.56 3.9% 
Czech Republic 2002 200 14 4 0.011 1.99 1.0% 1.53 0.8% 
Czech Republic 2006 200 14 5 0.041 3.14 1.6% 7.80 3.9% 
Czech Republic 2010 200 14 5 0.010 1.81 0.9% 2.95 1.5% 
Czech Republic 2013 200 14 7 0.030 4.92 2.5% 4.97 2.5% 
Czech Republic 2017 200 14 9 0.032 4.58 2.3% 11.87 5.9% 
Finland 2003 200 15 6 0.102 3.61 1.8% 7.73 3.9% 
Finland 2007 200 15 7 0.080 5.70 2.9% 7.84 3.9% 
Finland 2011 200 15 7 0.086 7.04 3.5% 8.21 4.1% 
Finland 2015 200 13 7 0.087 5.54 2.8% 6.35 3.2% 
Luxembourg 1945 51 4 4 0.041 1.06 2.1% 3.84 7.5% 
Luxembourg 1948 26 2 4 0.056 1.23 4.7% 1.30 5.0% 
Luxembourg 1951 26 2 3 0.016 0.38 1.5% 1.09 4.2% 
Luxembourg 1954 52 4 4 0.032 1.18 2.3% 3.36 6.5% 
Luxembourg 1959 52 4 4 0.036 1.39 2.7% 2.91 5.6% 
Luxembourg 1964 56 4 5 0.016 0.77 1.4% 3.32 5.9% 
Luxembourg 1968 56 4 4 0.035 1.50 2.7% 2.74 4.9% 
Luxembourg 1974 59 4 5 0.031 1.10 1.9% 1.71 2.9% 
Luxembourg 1979 59 4 6 0.043 1.67 2.8% 4.02 6.8% 
Luxembourg 1984 64 4 5 0.055 1.99 3.1% 3.47 5.4% 
Luxembourg 1989 60 4 7 0.092 2.25 3.7% 3.99 6.7% 
Luxembourg 1994 60 4 5 0.016 0.76 1.3% 1.78 3.0% 
Luxembourg 1999 60 4 6 0.059 2.32 3.9% 2.97 5.0% 
Luxembourg 2004 60 4 5 0.024 1.07 1.8% 2.26 3.8% 
Luxembourg 2009 60 4 6 0.049 0.96 1.6% 2.70 4.5% 
Luxembourg 2013 60 4 7 0.074 1.46 2.4% 3.34 5.6% 
Netherlands 1948 100 1 8 0.014 1.00 1.0% 1.31 1.3% 
Netherlands 1952 100 1 8 0.015 0.73 0.7% 1.44 1.4% 
Netherlands 1956 150 1 7 0.006 0.63 0.4% 0.90 0.6% 
Netherlands 1959 150 1 8 0.015 1.26 0.8% 2.31 1.5% 
Netherlands 1963 150 1 10 0.018 1.22 0.8% 1.78 1.2% 
Netherlands 1967 150 1 11 0.014 1.35 0.9% 2.25 1.5% 
Netherlands 1971 150 1 14 0.021 1.75 1.2% 3.35 2.2% 
Netherlands 1972 150 1 14 0.018 1.60 1.1% 2.55 1.7% 
Netherlands 1977 150 1 11 0.020 0.73 0.5% 2.80 1.9% 
Netherlands 1981 150 1 10 0.025 1.33 0.9% 1.52 1.0% 
                                                 
15 Without regional parties. 
16 The Bhattacharyya angle is not applicable to the modified cube law results, as the modified cube law does not 
guarantee that seat estimates for all parties will sum up to national seat totals, which means that seat shares can 
lie outside the probability simplex. 
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Netherlands 1982 150 1 12 0.028 1.42 0.9% 2.79 1.9% 
Netherlands 1986 150 1 9 0.024 1.24 0.8% 2.68 1.8% 
Netherlands 1989 150 1 9 0.021 1.15 0.8% 2.66 1.8% 
Netherlands 1994 150 1 12 0.024 1.53 1.0% 3.07 2.0% 
Netherlands 1998 150 1 9 0.020 1.27 0.8% 1.47 1.0% 
Netherlands 2002 150 1 10 0.016 1.24 0.8% 2.27 1.5% 
Netherlands 2003 150 1 9 0.012 1.29 0.9% 1.81 1.2% 
Netherlands 2006 150 1 10 0.017 1.51 1.0% 1.58 1.1% 
Netherlands 2010 150 1 10 0.019 1.50 1.0% 1.36 0.9% 
Netherlands 2012 150 1 11 0.021 1.69 1.1% 2.51 1.7% 
Netherlands 2017 150 1 13 0.018 1.53 1.0% 1.79 1.2% 
Poland 2005 460 41 6 0.015 5.72 1.2% 14.68 3.2% 
Poland 2007 460 41 4 0.014 6.13 1.3% 13.85 3.0% 
Poland 2011 460 41 5 0.010 3.92 0.9% 22.41 4.9% 
Poland 2015 460 41 5 0.022 6.88 1.5% 22.82 5.0% 
Portugal 1975 250 25 5 0.086 6.08 2.4% 11.11 4.4% 
Portugal 1976 263 24 4 0.063 3.54 1.3% 4.53 1.7% 
Portugal 1979 250 22 3 0.063 1.00 0.4% 3.71 1.5% 
Portugal 1980 250 22 3 0.063 1.40 0.6% 2.56 1.0% 
Portugal 1983 250 22 4 0.013 2.51 1.0% 3.97 1.6% 
Portugal 1985 250 22 5 0.015 3.38 1.4% 7.16 2.9% 
Portugal 1987 250 22 5 0.034 5.24 2.1% 12.39 5.0% 
Portugal 1991 230 22 4 0.087 5.96 2.6% 7.50 3.3% 
Portugal 1995 230 22 4 0.015 2.55 1.1% 7.92 3.4% 
Portugal 1999 230 22 4 0.096 5.32 2.3% 6.29 2.7% 
Portugal 2002 230 22 4 0.118 5.70 2.5% 7.49 3.3% 
Portugal 2005 230 22 5 0.027 3.63 1.6% 11.56 5.0% 
Portugal 2009 230 22 5 0.034 5.92 2.6% 11.26 4.9% 
Portugal 2011 230 22 5 0.045 5.26 2.3% 8.74 3.8% 
Portugal 2015 230 22 4 0.071 3.69 1.6% 7.26 3.2% 
Spain 1977 350 52 3 0.144 18.28 5.2% 26.51 7.6% 
Spain 1979 350 52 2 0.136 21.55 6.2% 27.33 7.8% 
Spain 1982 350 52 3 0.139 12.50 3.6% 16.38 4.7% 
Spain 1986 350 52 3 0.120 11.15 3.2% 11.83 3.4% 
Spain 1989 350 52 4 0.035 5.16 1.5% 24.02 6.9% 
Spain 1993 350 52 3 0.068 6.07 1.7% 17.14 4.9% 
Spain 1996 350 52 2 0.080 8.26 2.4% 11.30 3.2% 
Spain 2000 350 52 2 0.119 11.20 3.2% 10.02 2.9% 
Spain 2004 350 52 3 0.112 7.51 2.1% 7.87 2.2% 
Spain 2008 350 52 2 0.094 4.28 1.2% 6.15 1.8% 
Spain 2011 350 52 3 0.105 12.25 3.5% 11.39 3.3% 
Spain 2015 350 52 4 0.088 14.22 4.1% 21.14 6.0% 
Spain 2016 350 52 4 0.035 9.39 2.7% 15.18 4.3% 
This much larger sample of elections demonstrates that the seat allocation formula does 
indeed work as expected and is robust against violations of its assumptions. Only in 4 out of 
~ 14 ~ 
84 elections have more than 4% seats been misallocated.17 The robustness of the formula 
undoubtedly requires further investigation, which is, however, beyond the scope of this 
article. Nevertheless, our preliminary study of the subject suggests that under typical 
conditions encountered in real-life elections (unless the system is gerrymandered or otherwise 
deliberately skewed in favor of some type of parties), the errors introduced at different stages 
of approximation tend to largely cancel each other out, thereby making the overall error much 
smaller than initially expected18. See Appendix A for details. 
Finally, we have created two density plots illustrating the distribution of absolute party errors 
(absolute differences between actual and predicted seat allocations) and relative party errors 
(absolute party errors divided by national seat totals), see Fig. 1 and 2. The plots illustrate that 
for more than 93.3% of the cases (each party’s electoral run being a separate case) the 
absolute error is within the [−3, 3] interval, and for more 94.0% of the cases the relative error 
is within the [−1.5%, 1.5%] interval. 
3. Mathematical underpinnings
3.1. The Jefferson-D’Hondt method 
There are in common use several formulations of the Jefferson-D’Hondt seat allocation 
method. The original method proposed by Victor D’Hondt (1882) closely tracked a 1792 
proposal by Thomas Jefferson for apportioning seats among the states in the U.S. House of 
17 Three of those cases are the Spanish elections of 1977, 1979, and 2015, where there were significant 
correlations between the vote shares of the left-wing parties (PSOE and PCE in 1977 and 1979, Podemos in 
2015) and district size and magnitude, and the last one is the Luxembourg election of 1948, which was held in 
only two districts (so all parties exhibited a perfect positive or negative correlation between vote share and 
district size and magnitude). 
18 At least part of that overall error is systematic in nature and correlated with the number of parties. It can be 
shown that as the number of dimensions of a simplex 𝑛 increases to infinity, the expected taxicab distance 
between two random points drawn from that simplex with a distribution supported evenly on the whole simplex 
(which is equivalent up to a constant to the expected value of the normalized Loosemore-Hanby index) increases 
asymptotically to ca. 1. 
Fig. 1. Distribution of absolute party errors modeled by 
the kernel density estimation method with bandwidth 
fitted by least squares cross-validation.
Fig. 2. Distribution of relative party errors modeled by 
the kernel density estimation method with bandwidth 
fitted by least squares cross-validation.
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Representatives (Jefferson, 1792) (though it is unclear whether D’Hondt knew of Jefferson’s 
work on the subject19). It called for finding such a divisor 𝐷 that if each party (or state) were 
to be allocated as many seats 𝑠𝑖 as its number of votes (or population) 𝑣𝑖 divided by 𝐷, 
rounding down to the nearest integer, i.e., if 𝑠𝑖 = ⌊𝑣𝑖 𝐷⁄ ⌋, no seats would remain unallocated, 
i.e., ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝑠.20 It is easy to demonstrate that – unless an electoral tie occurs – such divisors 
always exist21 and they will always yield the same distribution of seats. 
There remains the question of finding an appropriate divisor. As noted by Pukelsheim 
(2014, 2017), all solutions in common use are similar in form. First, we pick a starting value 
𝐷 ∈ (0,∞) (a divisor initialization) and let the seat vector 𝑠′ ≔ (⌊𝑣1 𝐷⁄ ⌋, … , ⌊𝑣𝑛 𝐷⁄ ⌋). Then, 
as long as the allocated seats do not sum up to 𝑠, we adjust the divisor using the jump-and-
step algorithm. If ∑ 𝑠𝑖′𝑛𝑖=1 < 𝑠, we choose any 𝐷 ∈ �𝑄(𝑛−1),𝑄(𝑛)�, and if ∑ 𝑠𝑖′𝑛𝑖=1 > 𝑠, we 
choose any 𝐷 ∈ �𝑞(1), 𝑞(2)�, where 𝑞𝑖 ≔ 𝑣𝑖 𝑠𝑖′⁄  is the votes-to-seats ratio for the 𝑖-th party, 
𝑄𝑖 ≔ 𝑣𝑖 (𝑠𝑖′ + 1)⁄  is the votes-to-seats-plus-one ratio for the 𝑖-th party, and 𝑋(𝑘) denotes the 
𝑘-th smallest element of the set {𝑋1, … ,𝑋𝑛}. Among the possible initializations one can 
consider the simple quota, 𝑣 𝑠⁄  (D’Hondt, 1882; cf. Hare, 1859), the Hagenbach-Bischoff 
quota ⌊𝑣 (𝑠 + 1)⁄ ⌋ + 1 (Hagenbach-Bischoff, 1888, 1905; cf. Droop, 1881), and the Gfeller-
Joachim-Pukelsheim quota, 𝑣 (𝑠 + 𝑛 2⁄ )⁄  (Gfeller, 1890; Joachim, 1917).22 The latter quota 
has been established by Happacher & Pukelsheim (1996, 2000) to have the unique property of 
being asymptotically unbiased as the number of seats approaches infinity.23 
An alternative formulation of the D’Hondt method, first introduced by D’Hondt himself in 
1885, and by far the most popular among legislators and political scientists,24 is an 
                                                 
19 James (1897: 36) has probably been the first to notice that the Jefferson method is equivalent to the D’Hondt 
method, but it appears that this finding has escaped the attention of the subsequent generations of scholars. As far 
as we aware, Balinski & Young (1975: 703) have been the first modern authors to credit Jefferson with the 
original authorship of the method. It should be noted that the Jefferson method was enacted into law (Act of Apr. 
14, 1792, c. 23, 1 Stat. 253) and has remained in use for apportioning representatives among the states until 
1842. For an extensive discussion of the history of congressional apportionment methods, see Biles (2017). 
20 Under the original Jefferson plan, the divisor has been fixed, while the number of seats has been allowed to 
vary (Balinski & Young, 1978). In such a case, of course, the jump-and-step algorithm is omitted, but all the 
subsequent steps, the final results, and the mathematical properties of the method are otherwise identical. 
21 Electoral ties are very rare empirically (no such tie occurred in any of the elections analyzed in Sec. 2; for 
a more general discussion of the frequency of ties, see Mulligan & Hunter, 2001) and negligible theoretically (as 
the set of points on the probability simplex of vote shares for which such ties occur has a Lebesgue measure 
zero). In addition, a tie-resolution rule will always be arbitrary from the standpoint of the Jefferson-D’Hondt 
method, and an analysis of such a rule’s application will therefore provide no useful insight into the subject 
under discussion. For those reasons, we do not concern ourselves with ties in the following analysis. 
22 For an in-depth discussion of the origin and attribution of the most popular electoral quotas, see Dančišin 
(2013a). 
23 A number of scholars have analyzed the distribution of discrepancies arising under the proposed quotas. 
Happacher (2001) has provided an analytic formula for a probability mass function of the discrepancy under 
the assumption that vote shares are drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit simplex. Janson (2013: 
Theorem 7.5) has established that as the number of seats approaches infinity, the discrepancy distribution 
approaches the Euler-Frobenius distribution. Finally, Heinrich, Pukelsheim & Wachtel (2017) find that the 
discrepancy distribution can be approximated by the distribution obtained by applying standard rounding to 
a sum of uniformly distributed random variables. 
24 For instance, all EU countries employing the D’Hondt method for legislative elections – except Luxembourg – 
include this algorithmic formulation in their electoral legislation. It can be noted that this formulation of the 
d’Hondt method closely resembles an earlier proposal by Burnitz & Varrentrapp (1863), who called for 
a modified version of the Borda count, with each elector ranking no more than 𝑠 candidates, ranks being 
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algorithmic one. Let 𝑠 be the number of seats to be allocated within a given district and 𝑣𝑖 be 
the number of votes cast for the i-th party (𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛) in that district. We define a k-th 
quotient for the i-th party as 𝑣𝑖 𝑘⁄  for 𝑘 = 1,2, … . Let 𝑞𝑠 be the s-th highest quotient overall, 
i.e., across all parties. The number of seats 𝑠𝑖 allocated to the i-th party is then defined as the 
number of the smallest quotient for the i-th party larger than or equal to 𝑞𝑠.25 
It is well known that the two methods are equivalent, i.e., they always generate an identical 
allocation of seats. For an early proof, see Equer (1911). To check it quickly, assume 𝑠𝑖′ 
(𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛) is the number of seats awarded to the i-th party under the “algorithmic” method. 
Clearly, ∑ 𝑠𝑖′𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝑠. Assume that 𝐷 ∈ (𝑞𝑠+1, 𝑞𝑠]. Observe that we have then 𝑣𝑖 𝑠𝑖′⁄ ≥ 𝑞𝑠 ≥ 𝐷 >
𝑞𝑠+1 ≥ 𝑣𝑖 (𝑠𝑖′ + 1) ⁄  and, in consequence, 𝑠𝑖′ = ⌊𝑣𝑖 𝐷⁄ ⌋ for every 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛, as desired.26 
Unfortunately, the divisor formula still does not permit a party’s seat allocation to be 
estimated without full knowledge of vote shares of the other parties. Put 𝑀 ∶= 𝑣 𝐷⁄ , where 
𝐷 is any divisor in the D’Hondt method. Then 𝑠 ≤ 𝑀 < 𝑠 + 𝑛. It should be noted that M need 
not be an integer. Let 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛. We have 𝑠𝑖 = ⌊𝑣𝑖 𝐷⁄ ⌋ = ⌊𝑣𝑖𝑀 𝑣⁄ ⌋ = ⌊𝑝𝑖𝑀⌋, where 
𝑝𝑖 ∶= 𝑣𝑖 𝑣⁄  is the fraction of total votes (the “vote share”) cast for the i-th party. Let us denote 
the rounding residual of 𝑝𝑖𝑀 as 
𝑟𝑖 ∶= 𝑝𝑖𝑀 − ⌊𝑝𝑖𝑀⌋ = 𝑝𝑖𝑀 − 𝑠𝑖 . (3.1) 
Summing this over 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛 we get ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝑀 − 𝑠. Now we use the assumption A4, 
which states that ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 = 𝑛/2 or, equivalently, 𝑀 = 𝑛/2 + 𝑠. Substituting this equality in 
(3.1) we obtain 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖(𝑠 + 𝑛/2) − 𝑟𝑖 . (3.2) 
Hence under A4 the number of seats for the i-th party in a single district can be expressed as 
above. 
3.2. Aggregation over multiple districts 
Let 𝑣𝑖𝑘, 𝑠𝑖𝑘, and 𝑟𝑖𝑘 be, respectively, the number of votes received, the number of seats 
awarded, and the fractional expression defined by (3.1) for the i-th party (𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛) in the  
k-th electoral district (𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑐).27 Let 𝑣𝑖 ∶= ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1  and 𝑠𝑖 ∶= ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1  be, respectively, 
the nationwide vote and seat numbers for the i-th party, and let 𝑣𝑘 ∶= ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑖=1  and 
𝑠𝑘 ∶= ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑖=1  be, respectively, the district vote and seat totals for the k-th district. Finally, let 
𝑣 ∶= ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1  and 𝑠 ∶= ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑐𝑘=1  be, respectively, nationwide vote and 
                                                                                                                                                         
translated to scores harmonically, and seats being awarded to 𝑠 candidates with the highest scores. Of course, if 
the whole electorate was divided into perfectly disciplined partisan voting blocks, and each block unanimously 
votes for the same candidates in the same order, the Burnitz-Varrentrapp systems would be equivalent to 
d’Hondt. 
25 If 𝑞𝑠+1 = 𝑞𝑠, the procedure described herein will allocate more than s seats. This situation is equivalent to 
an electoral tie. 
26 In fact, the algorithmic formulation of the D’Hondt method is equivalent to the jump-and-step algorithm with 
initialization 𝐷 = ∞ (which is always the least optimal choice of initialization, as for each possible vote share 
vector it requires exactly 𝑠 iterations to arrive at a correct divisor). 
27 For districts uncontested by the 𝑖-th party we assume that 𝑣𝑖𝑘 = 0. 
~ 17 ~ 
 
seat totals. In this case, using assumption A5, which states that ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1 = 𝑐/2, we get by 
aggregating single-district formulae (3.2) applied to all 𝑐 districts 
𝑠𝑖 = ��𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑣𝑘 �𝑠𝑘 + 𝑛2� − 𝑟𝑖𝑘�𝑐
𝑘=1
= 
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑠𝑘 +𝑐
𝑘=1
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑛2𝑐
𝑘=1
− 𝑐
1
𝑐
�𝑟𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= 
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑠𝑘 +𝑐
𝑘=1
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑛2𝑐
𝑘=1
− 𝑐/2. 
(3.3) 
Let 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛. Note that 
𝑝𝑖𝑠 + 𝑝𝑖 𝑐𝑛2 − 𝑐2 = 
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
�𝑠𝑘 +𝑐
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
𝑐𝑛2 − 𝑐2 . (3.4) 
Comparing (3.3) and (3.4) we deduce that (0.1) holds if and only if 
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑠𝑘 +𝑐
𝑘=1
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑛2𝑐
𝑘=1
= ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
�𝑠𝑘 +𝑐
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
𝑐𝑛2  . (3.5) 
This equality is satisfied if 
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑠𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
�𝑠𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
 (3.6) 
and 
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑛2𝑐
𝑘=1
= ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
𝑐𝑛2  . (3.7) 
(Or if neither (3.6) nor (3.7) holds, but the differences cancel each other out.)  
Now, note first that (3.7) is equivalent to 1
𝑐
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
 ,  1
𝑐
�𝑝𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= ∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
 ,  1
𝑐
�𝑝𝑖
𝑘 ∙
𝑐
𝑘=1
1
𝑐
�𝑣𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= 1
𝑐
�𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝑣𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
 (3.8) 
— which is true if the vote shares of the i-th party (𝑝𝑖𝑘) are not correlated with the district size 
(𝑣𝑘) (assumption A2). 
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The left-hand side of (3.6) is 
�
𝑣𝑖
𝑘
𝑣𝑘
𝑠𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= �𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑠𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1
. (3.9) 
On the other hand, applying (3.8) we can transform the right-hand side of (3.6) in the 
following way: 
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
�𝑠𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
𝑐 ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝑣𝑘𝑐𝑘=1
�𝑝𝑖
𝑘 ∙
𝑐
𝑘=1
�𝑠𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= 1
𝑐
�𝑝𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
�𝑠𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
. (3.10) 
From (3.9) and (3.10) we deduce that (3.6) is equivalent to  1
𝑐
�𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝑠𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= 1
𝑐
�𝑝𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
∙
1
𝑐
�𝑠𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
 (3.11) 
— which is true if the vote shares of the i-th party (𝑝𝑖𝑘) are not correlated with the district 
magnitude (𝑠𝑘) (assumption A3). 
Summing up, (0.1) follows from the assumptions, and so we arrive at our main result: 
Proposition. If assumptions A1-A5 hold, then for every 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛 we have 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑠 + 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑛2 − 𝑐2 , 
or equivalently 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖 − 1/𝑛2𝑚/𝑛 = �1 + 𝑛2𝑚�𝑝𝑖 − 12𝑚 , 
where 𝑞𝑖 is the seats share for 𝑖-th party and 𝑚 is the mean number of seats per district. 
3.3. Natural threshold 
As noted in Sec. 1.2 above, the formula can only be applied to relevant parties, i.e., such 
parties that exceed both the applicable statutory threshold, if any, and the mean natural 
threshold. The former are easy to account for: since parties that fall below them are ignored in 
the seat allocation process, we simply eliminate them from the electoral results data set before 
starting any processing. Natural thresholds call for a more sophisticated treatment, since they 
depend in each case on the actual distribution of party vote shares. Yet we cannot ignore 
them, since not only applying formula (0.1) for the sub-threshold parties can yield negative 
seat numbers (which are obviously incorrect), but including them in the number of relevant 
parties would inflate n and thereby distort results for the supra-threshold parties as well. 
To avoid this kind of error, we use an iterative algorithm for determining the number of 
relevant parties and for identifying the supra-threshold parties. The basic strategy is as 
follows: first, we sort 𝑁 parties degressively according to their original (non-renormalized) 
vote share (𝑃1 > ⋯ > 𝑃𝑁). Then we start with only one party, the largest one, in the model, 
and continue to add parties, according to the sort order, until we encounter the first party with 
a negative seat number. At that point, we eliminate such a party and end the algorithm. 
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From (0.1) we deduce that n has to fulfill condition 
𝑝𝑛 > 12𝑚 + 𝑛 , (3.12) 
where 𝑚 ∶= 𝑠 𝑐⁄  is the mean district magnitude and 𝑝𝑛 is the renormalized support for the 𝑛-th 
party, with only the first 𝑛 parties taken into account. This is equivalent to 
𝑛 > ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑖=1
𝑃𝑛
− 2𝑚 (3.13) 
and so to 2𝑚 > � 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑛
𝑃𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
. (3.14) 
For our algorithm to be correct, the above condition should hold for a given 𝑛, if it holds for 
𝑛 − 1. To show that this is indeed the case, it is enough to observe that the right-hand side of 
(3.14) increases in 𝑛, since 
�
𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑛+1
𝑃𝑛+1
𝑛+1
𝑖=1
−�
𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑛
𝑃𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
= � 𝑃𝑖(𝑃𝑛 − 𝑃𝑛+1)
𝑃𝑛+1𝑃𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
≥ 0, (3.15) 
which is true, as parties are sorted degressively by the number of votes. In consequence, 𝑛 is 
the largest natural number such that 12𝑚 + 𝑛 < 𝑃𝑛∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  (3.16) 
holds, and so 
𝑡 ∶= 12𝑚 + 𝑛 (3.17) 
is our estimate of the natural threshold. It can be used to express (0.2) in yet another form, 
𝑞𝑖 = �1 + 𝑛2𝑚� (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑡), (3.18) 
which demonstrates that the seat shares depend linearly on the over-threshold vote shares. 
We can further note that if 
𝑃𝑛
∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
> 12𝑚 , (3.19) 
then the inequality (3.12) will always be satisfied, meaning that we can easily start the 
algorithm with the first party that does not satisfy equation (3.19).  
Note that for the single-district case (𝑚 = 𝑠) this result is in accord with the earlier works on 
the subject by D’Hondt (1883), Rokkan (1968), Rae, Hanby & Loosemore (1971), 
Lijphart & Gibberd (1977), and Palomares & Ramírez (2003), who estimated the threshold of 
exclusion to be 1/(𝑠 + 1) and the threshold of inclusion to be 1/(𝑁 + 𝑠 − 1), where 𝑁 is the 
overall number of parties. Namely, it is easy to show that our formula gives at least 1/2 seat 
for a party fulfilling 𝑃 > 1/(𝑠 + 1) ≥ 1/(2𝑠 + 𝑛), and at most (𝑠 + 1)/(𝑠 + 𝑁 − 1)/2 ≤1/2 for a party satisfying 𝑃 < 1/(𝑁 + 𝑠 − 1), though the latter is not necessarily excluded 
from our algorithm as it cannot be ruled out that 𝑡 < 1/(𝑁 + 𝑠 − 1). 
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Given discreteness of the number of parties 𝑛 appearing in formula (0.1), one could prima 
facie expect that as a new party crosses the natural threshold or as one of the existing parties 
falls below the threshold, the number of seats for every other party would change 
discontinuously. This would obviously constitute a significant obstacle to applying formula 
(0.1) to estimate seat allocations under circumstances where 𝑃1, … ,𝑃𝑛 are known only 
approximately (for instance, obtained from opinion polls) and some parties are in the vicinity 
of the natural threshold. Fortunately, as the next paragraph demonstrates, this is not the case. 
Imagine that we know that 𝑛 largest parties are relevant in the sense of the algorithm 
described above and that we have one more (smaller) party to allocate some seats. Let parties 
numbered from 1 to 𝑛 + 1 be sorted degressively, i.e., 𝑃1 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑃𝑛 ≥ 𝑃𝑛+1. Put 𝑃 ∶= 𝑃𝑛+1. 
We would like to show that 𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛, 𝑠𝑛+1 depend continuously on 𝑃 ∈ [0,𝑃𝑛]. In fact, the 
only doubtful case is 𝑃 = 𝑃′, where 𝑃′ fulfills 𝑃′ = 𝑡′�∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 + 𝑃′�, i.e., 𝑃′ = 𝑡′1−𝑡′ ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 , 
where 𝑡′ ∶= 1 (2𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1)⁄ . For 𝑃 < 𝑃′ we have 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖(𝑃) ∶= �1/𝑡2𝑚 𝑃𝑖∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 − 12𝑚 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛0 𝑖 = 𝑛 + 1   . (3.20) 
On the other hand, for 𝑃 > 𝑃′ and 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛,𝑛 + 1 we obtain 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖(𝑃) ∶= 1/𝑡′2𝑚 𝑃𝑖𝑃 + ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 − 12𝑚 . (3.21) 
Now, for 𝑃 → 𝑃′,𝑃 > 𝑃′ we have for 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛 
𝑠𝑖(𝑃) = 1 𝑡′⁄2𝑚 𝑃𝑖𝑃 + ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑗=1 − 12𝑚 → 1 𝑡′⁄2𝑚 𝑃𝑖𝑃′ + ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 − 12𝑚 = 1 − 𝑡′2𝑚𝑡′ 𝑃𝑖∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 − 12𝑚 = 2𝑚 + 𝑛2𝑚 𝑃𝑖∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 − 12𝑚 = 1/𝑡2𝑚 𝑃𝑖∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 − 12𝑚 , (3.22) 
and for 𝑖 = 𝑛 + 1 
𝑠𝑖(𝑃) = 1 𝑡′⁄2𝑚 𝑃𝑃 + ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 − 12𝑚 → 1 𝑡′⁄2𝑚 𝑃′𝑃′ + ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 − 12𝑚 = 0, (3.23) 
as desired. 
3.4. Artificial threshold 
Unlike the natural thresholds, the artificial thresholds (if greater than the former) give rise to 
discontinuities in the seats-votes curves of all parties (not just those that are immediately 
affected by it)28. Accordingly, if the electoral results are not known exactly, but only predicted 
                                                 
28 Among the seven countries for which we test our formula in Sec. 2, four – Croatia, the Czech Republic, the 
Netherlands and Poland – employ some form of a national artificial threshold. In the Netherlands it equals the 
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on the basis of polls or other models, and confidence intervals for the results overlap the 
artificial threshold, an additional source of potential error is introduced. The discontinuities in 
question, however, can be easily quantified. Let us initially consider a simple case where 
𝜏 > 𝑡 is the statutory threshold, 𝑛 − 1 parties are certain to cross it and only the 𝑛-th party is 
uncertain. Note that it is not necessary for the 𝑛-th party to be the smallest one – due to 
different classes of thresholds for different types of electoral actors, it is possible for a party to 
fail to cross its threshold, while some other smaller parties are certain to cross theirs29. Then 
the 𝑖-th party (with 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛 − 1) increase of seat share arising from the 𝑛-th party 
failure to cross the threshold (and conversely – its decrease of seat share arising from the 𝑛-th 
party success in doing so) equals: 
𝑇𝑖 ≔ lim𝑝𝑛→𝜏− 𝑠𝑖 − lim𝑝𝑛→𝜏+ 𝑠𝑖 = = 𝑝𝑖1 − 𝜏 �1 + 𝑛 − 12𝑚 � − 12𝑚− 𝑝𝑖 �1 + 𝑛2𝑚� + 12𝑚 = = 𝑝𝑖2𝑚�2𝑚 + 𝑛 − 11 − 𝜏 − 2𝑚− 𝑛� = = 𝑝𝑖2𝑚�𝜏(2𝑚 + 𝑛) − 11 − 𝜏 � = 𝑝𝑖2𝑚�𝜏 𝑡⁄ − 11 − 𝜏 �, 
(3.24) 
where 𝑡 is given by (3.17). Note that for 𝜏 = 𝑡 (i.e., the artificial threshold equaling the natural 
threshold), 𝑇𝑖 = 0, and the discontinuity disappears. 
Formula (3.24) can be easily extended to the case of 𝑘 out of 𝑛 parties being uncertain to cross 
the threshold: 
𝑇𝑖(𝑘) = 𝑝𝑖2𝑚�𝜏 𝑡⁄ − 11/𝑘 − 𝜏�. (3.25) 
A party’s relative seat gain from the others’ failure to cross the threshold can be expressed as: 
𝑇𝑖(𝑘)
𝑠𝑖
= 𝜏 − 𝑡(1 𝑘⁄ − 𝜏)(1 − 𝑡 𝑝𝑖⁄ ) ≈ 𝜏 − 𝑡(1 𝑘⁄ − 𝑡)(1 − 𝑡 𝑝𝑖⁄ ). (3.26) 
Note that 
𝑇𝑖(𝑘)
𝑠𝑖
= 𝜏 − 𝑡(1 𝑘⁄ − 𝜏)(1 − 𝑡 𝑝𝑖⁄ ) ≥ 𝑘 𝜏 − 𝑡1 − 𝑡/𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝑘(𝜏 − 𝑡), (3.27) 
and 
                                                                                                                                                         
Hare quota (1 150⁄ ), while in Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Poland – 5%. However, in the latter two 
countries there are also higher thresholds for coalitions of parties (8% in Poland, and 10%, 15% or even 20% – 
depending on the number of the coalition partners – in the Czech Republic). The Turkish threshold of 10% 
seems to provide currently the upper bound for the artificial thresholds applicable to individual parties. 
29 For instance, in Poland in 2015 the United Left coalition failed to cross the coalition threshold of 8% with the 
vote share of 7.55%, while the Polish People’s Party qualified for seats with a smaller vote share of 5.13%, as the 
threshold for individual parties was only 5%. 
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𝑇𝑖(𝑘)
𝑠𝑖
= 𝜏 − 𝑡(1 𝑘⁄ − 𝜏)(1 − 𝑡 𝑝𝑖⁄ ) ≤ 𝜏1 𝑘⁄ − 𝜏. (3.28) 
Accordingly, for 𝑘 = 1 a party’s relative seat gain from a single competitor’s failure to cross 
the threshold satisfies 𝜏 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑖 𝑠𝑖⁄ ≤ 𝜏 (1 − 𝜏)⁄ . 
 
Fig. 3. Absolute seat share gains from a single competitor’s failure to cross electoral threshold 
(estimated for 𝒎 = 𝟏𝟎 and 𝒏 = 𝟓, where 𝒕 = 𝟏/𝟐𝟓) 
 
Fig. 4. Relative seat share gains from a single competitor’s failure to cross electoral threshold (estimated for 𝒎 = 𝟏𝟎 
and 𝒏 = 𝟓). The dotted lines represent the lower and the upper bound given by, respectively, (3.27) – a straight line 
and (3.28) - a fragment of hyperbola. 
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4. Political consequences 
4.1. Political determinants of the seat bias 
The political implications of the seat bias formula become immediately clear when the latter is 
stated in a form (0.3) which expresses the seat bias of the 𝑖-th party as the product of three 
parameters: the inverse of the mean district magnitude, the number of relevant parties, and the 
deviation of the 𝑖-th party vote share from the mean vote share. Of those, the mean district 
magnitude is the most stable one,30 as it is not only completely exogenous to the election 
results, but is virtually always fixed by statute.31 In most of the eight countries discussed in 
Sec. 2, the mean district magnitude varies between 11 and 16. The exceptions are Spain (with 
a mean district magnitude of 6.7332) and the Netherlands (with a single 150-seat district). 
The number of parties is a more variable parameter, though in institutionalized party systems 
it rarely varies drastically and can be predicted with reasonable accuracy from the exogenous 
parameters, such as the size of the legislature (see Shugart & Taagepera, 2017), permitting it 
to be still considered “systemic” in nature. As expected, it correlates with the mean district 
magnitude, with Spain (three nationally relevant parties in 2000 and 2004) and the 
Netherlands (fourteen relevant parties in 1971 and 1972) again being the extreme cases. Most 
countries under consideration tend to average at five-six relevant parties. 
Finally, the last parameter influencing the seat bias is party size (normalized vote share). 
While variability of this parameter is related to the number of parties (Taagepera, 2007), the 
relationship is nontrivial. Similarly sized parties occur in party systems with very different 
numbers of relevant parties. Yet the party size is ultimately the key determinant of the size of 
the seat bonus, distinguishing the winners and losers of the Jefferson-D’Hondt method. 
Some of the relationships revealed by the seat bias formula are well known to students of 
electoral systems. For instance, there is nothing new about a finding of negative effects of 
small districts on small parties, as the same follows from the celebrated micromega rule (“the 
large prefer the small and the small prefer the large,” see Colomer, 2004) and has already 
been well established by Rae (1967), Taagepera & Laakso (1980), Taagepera (1986), and 
Taagepera & Shugart (1989). Nevertheless, note that under the Jefferson-D’Hondt method this 
effect is magnified, as the negative seat bias arises entirely apart from the exclusionary effect 
of the small district magnitude documented by Lijphart & Gibberd (1977). Also observe that 
where very large districts are involved – as in the Netherlands – the bias becomes negligible. 
The effect of the second parameter – the number of parties – on the magnitude of the seat bias 
appears to have escaped the attention of many electoral scholars. It demonstrates, however, an 
                                                 
30 In three out of the eight countries for which we tested the formula (the Czech Republic, Poland, and Spain) the 
mean district magnitude remained constant since the introduction of the D’Hondt formula. In four of the others 
its standard deviation of the mean district magnitude across all elections did not exceed 1. Only in the 
Netherlands a major change in district magnitude occurred due to a 50% house size increase in 1956. 
31 Even in those countries where apportionment of representatives among districts is made without legislative 
involvement, the legislature – or the national constitution – fixes the number of seats to be apportioned and the 
number of districts, which together determine mean district magnitude. Pilet et al. (2016) consider each change 
in the latter two parameters to be a major change in the electoral rules. 
32 Baldini & Pappalardo (2009: 67-69) note that Spain has one of the lowest district magnitudes in Europe, which 
makes its electoral system one of the least proportional PR systems. 
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important self-correcting aspect of the electoral systems based on the Jefferson-D’Hondt 
method: as the number of parties increases, so does the bias of the largest party, at least 
partially alleviating difficulties in government formation caused by legislative fragmentation. 
To illustrate the importance of the two systemic parameters, on Figs. 5 and 6 we plot the seat 
biases for two hypothetical parties with a normalized vote share of, respectively, 40% and 
10% – as it varies depending on the number of parties (from 2 to 9) and the district magnitude. 
 
Fig. 5. Seat bias of a party with a normalized vote share of 40% as a function of mean district magnitude. 
 
Fig. 6. Seat bias of a party with a normalized vote share of 10% as a function of district magnitude. 
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There remains the relationship between the vote share and the seat bias. The first glance at the 
seat bias formula (0.3) reveals that it is affine and increasing. Its slope 𝑛/(2𝑚) and intercept 
− 1 (2𝑚)⁄  depend on the two electoral parameters: the mean district magnitude (𝑚) and the 
number of parties (𝑛). To illustrate that, on Fig. 7 we plot the bias as a function of the vote 
share as the number of parties is either four or eight and as the mean district magnitude is 
either three (the smallest district magnitude for which speaking of proportional seat allocation 
makes sense) or sixteen (the upper boundary of the mean district magnitude for all multi-
district countries analyzed in Sec. 2). The points representing the votes share 
((𝑚 + 1) (2𝑚 + 𝑛)⁄ ) and the seat bias ((𝑛 − 2) (4𝑚 + 2𝑛)⁄ ) required to secure a majority of 
seats are likewise indicated, see also Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7. Seat bias (𝚫) as a function of vote share (𝒑) for specified electoral parameters. The dotted line 𝚫 = 𝟏 𝟐⁄ − 𝒑  
represents the size of the bias required to secure a majority of seats with the given vote share. 
4.2. Applications for the evaluation of political strategies 
As already noted, the seat bias formula can be applied to evaluate the mathematical effects of 
a number of electoral strategies, such as party divisions and mergers or manipulation of the 
district magnitude. Let us consider a few effects of the seat bias formula in this area. 
First. It is well known that as the D’Hondt system favors large parties, it provides 
an inducement for coalition formation, cf., Bochsler (2010). The seat bias formula (0.3) 
facilitates easy assessment of the theoretical integration bonus, i.e., the difference between the 
estimated bias Δ𝑖∪𝑗 of the coalition of parties 𝑖 and 𝑗 and the sum of the estimated biases of 
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the individual parties �Δ𝑖 + Δ𝑗� under the assumption that the vote shares of all other relevant 
parties remain constant: 
Δ𝑖∪𝑗 − �Δ𝑖 + Δ𝑗� = 1 − �𝑝𝑖 + 𝑝𝑗�2𝑚 , (4.1) 
cf. Janson (2014: Theorem 8.1) for analogous asymptotic formula for 𝑐 = 1 and 𝑠 → ∞. Note 
that the integration bonus does not depend on the number of third parties, but only on their 
total vote share, and that it is negatively related to the sum of the coalition parties’ vote shares. 
Of course, it should be noted that the seat bias formula is by itself insufficient to forecast the 
exact effects of coalition formation, as it is necessary to remember that such strategies carry 
a risk of alienating each party’s fringe electorate, as well as some probability of attracting 
additional voters due to the bandwagon effect (Kaminski, 2001), but at least the formula 
provides an initial estimate of the integration bonus and its derivative with respect to vote 
share changes. Moreover, while the coalition, taken together, will nearly always benefit and 
never lose from the merger, it does not necessarily follow that each member thereof will have 
adequate incentive to join. That will depend on how the seats are allocated within the 
coalition, see Leutgäb & Pukehlseim (2009), Janson (2014), and Karpov (2015). 
In addition, formula (4.1) can be easily transformed to model the reverse case: a breakup of 
a party or a coalition (for such applications, see Kaminski, 2018). Again, note that as long as 
all successor parties are above the natural and statutory thresholds, and the set of relevant 
third parties remains constant, the sum of the disintegrated coalition’s seat shares remains 
invariant with respect to the distribution of the successor parties’ vote shares. 
Second. Political strategies can also include electoral engineering. In proportional systems, 
such engineering usually takes the form of changes to the seat allocation method or to the 
number of electoral districts (Kaminski, 2002). In the latter case, the seat bias formula can be 
applied to estimate the effects of the change, again, modulo secondary effects, such as induced 
coalition formation among the opposition or changes in the distribution of vote shares. In 
particular, it can be easily deduced from (0.1) that the number 𝛿𝑖1 of districts that need to be 
added for the 𝑖-th party (𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛) to gain just one seat equals, depending on its vote share 
𝑝𝑖 and the number of relevant parties 𝑛: 
𝛿𝑖
1 = � 2
𝑝𝑖𝑛 − 1�. (4.2) 
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Fig. 8. The number of districts 𝜹𝒊
𝟏 that need to be added (to some initial number of districts 𝒄) for the 𝒊-th party to 
gain a single seat, depending on its vote share 𝒑𝒊 and the number of relevant parties 𝒏. 
Somewhat counterintuitively, 𝛿𝑖1 does not depend on the initial number of districts 𝑐. 
Moreover, it follows from (4.2) that 𝛿𝑖1 has singularity at 1/𝑛, which is not surprising, since 
there is no bias for mean-sized parties, so no matter how many districts are added, they will 
gain no seats as long as the number of relevant parties remains unchanged. Of course, in 
practice the interval where no change in seats is possible is wider, as the number of districts 
that can be added is bounded by the total number of seats. 
We shall complete the discussion of the political consequences of the seat bias formula with 
one final issue. While all parties seek to maximize their vote shares, most elections – and 
especially those in parliamentary systems – are still primarily about winning the legislative 
majority. The seat share formula (0.2) can be transformed to yield, for any combination of 
parameters 𝑚 (the mean district magnitude) and 𝑛 (the number of relevant parties), 
the minimum vote share 𝑝𝑀𝑎𝑗 that translates to a half of the total number of seats: 
𝑝𝑀𝑎𝑗 = 1 + 1 𝑚⁄2 + 𝑛 𝑚⁄  . (4.3) 
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This is illustrated by a contour plot. 
 
 
Fig. 9. The minimum share of votes necessary for a party to obtain a half of the total number of seats as a function of 
the number of relevant parties and the mean district magnitude. 
4.3. Efficiency gap and application of the formula to single-member systems 
Let us consider for a while the simplest case of electoral system to which the seat allocation 
and seat bias formulas can be applied: a two-party system33 (𝑛 = 2) with single-seat districts 
where seats are allocated by the first-past-the-post rule (which can be thought of as a limiting 
case of Jefferson-D’Hondt), i.e., with  𝑚 = 1, that is, 𝑐 = 𝑠. In this case, the seat allocation 
formula reduces to 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠 �2𝑝𝑖 − 12�, (4.4) 
and the natural threshold becomes equal to 1 (2𝑚 + 𝑛)⁄ = 1 4⁄ . A number of assumptions 
can also be simplified: A2 is equivalent to the requirement that the effective vote shares of 
both parties are independent of the effective district size (which is the number of votes cast for 
                                                 
33 By a two-party system we mean a system in which there are exactly two relevant parties. 
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the two largest parties)34, and A3 becomes trivial, as district magnitude is constant. Moreover, 
one can easily demonstrate that A4 is always satisfied: let 𝑝1𝑘 be the larger party’s vote share, 
and 𝑝2𝑘 = 1 − 𝑝1𝑘 be the smaller party’s share in any district 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑐. It follows that 
𝑝1
𝑘 > 1 2⁄  and 𝑝2𝑘 < 1 2⁄ , so 𝐷𝑘 = 𝑣𝑘 2⁄  (which is equal to the Gfeller-Joachim-Pukelsheim 
quota, see Sec. 3.1) is a proper divisor. Then the rounding residuals (see Sec. 3.1) are 
𝑟1
𝑘 = 𝑝1𝑘 𝑣𝑘𝐷𝑘 − �𝑝1 𝑣𝑘𝐷𝑘� = 2𝑝1𝑘 − �2𝑝1𝑘� = 2 �𝑝1𝑘 − 12� (4.5) 
and 
𝑟2
𝑘 = 𝑝2𝑘 𝑣𝑘𝐷𝑘 = 2𝑝2𝑘 = 2�1 − 𝑝1𝑘�. (4.6) 
Hence, we get 
𝑟1
𝑘 + 𝑟2𝑘 = 2𝑝1𝑘 − 1 + 2 − 2𝑝1𝑘 = 1 = 𝑛 2⁄ , (4.7) 
as desired. Finally, A5 can be stated in different terms. Let us express the sum of rounding 
residuals in terms of (4.5) and (4.6): 
�𝑟𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= 2 � �𝑝𝑖𝑘 − 12�
𝑘∈𝑊𝑖
+ 2 �𝑝𝑖𝑘
𝑘∈𝐿𝑖
, (4.8) 
where 𝑊𝑖 is the set of districts where the 𝑖-th party (𝑖 = 1,2) wins the election (i.e., 𝑝𝑖𝑘 >1 2⁄ ), and 𝐿𝑖 is the set of districts where it loses one (i.e., 𝑝𝑖𝑘 < 1 2⁄ ). Note that (4.5) and (4.6) 
are equal up to a constant factor of 2 to the winning and losing party’s share of wasted votes, 
as defined by McGhee (2014), and accordingly the right-hand side of (4.8) is equal twice the 
𝑖-th party’s share of wasted votes. In consequence, if our assumption A5 is satisfied, then 
∑ 𝑟1
𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1 = ∑ 𝑟2𝑘𝑐𝑘=1 , and so both parties waste the same number of votes. It also follows that 
since by (4.7), the sum of the rounding residuals of all parties over all districts equals the 
number of districts 𝑐, the wasted vote shares can only be equal if for both parties, 𝑖 = 1,2, 
∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1 = 1 2⁄ . Accordingly, A5 is equivalent to the assumption underlying the McGhee–
Stephanopoulos efficiency gap test (Stephanopoulos & McGhee, 2015) that has been proposed 
as a method for detecting partisan gerrymandering and obtained a great deal of recent 
attention in the field (see, e.g., Bernstein & Duchin, 2017; Chambers, Miller & Sobel, 2017; 
Plener Cover, 2018; Tapp, 2018; Veomett, 2018). Moreover our formula applied to single-
member districts is equivalent to their seats-votes formula. In fact, our assumptions constitute 
a generalization of the efficiency gap test, since instead of a quite restrictive assumption made 
by McGhee and Stephanopoulos that the effective district size is constant, we only assume 
that it is independent of party vote shares. 
                                                 
34 Note that the absence of malapportionment is neither necessary nor sufficient for A2 to be satisfied. Even if 
districts are perfectly equal in terms of the number of residents, but there are turnout differences or differences in 
the number of votes cast for third parties, a violation of assumption A2 can still occur. Cf. Brookes (1960). 
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There have been several attempts to extend the efficiency gap test to multi-party elections 
(McGhee, 2017; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, 2018; Tapp, 2018). It seems, however, that none 
of them have been deemed satisfactory. The main issue arises from the difficulties of 
providing a natural definition of wasted votes when multiple parties are competing. McGhee 
(2017, p. 429) suggested to retain the two-party definition, i.e., to put 𝑣𝑖𝑘 for the losing parties 
and max�𝑣𝑖𝑘 − 1 2⁄ , 0� for the winning parties, observing that no result below 1/2 guarantees 
success, as the probability of winning depends on the distribution of the competitors’ votes. 
This definition is based on an implicit assumption that all such distributions, including those 
where the entire competition vote concentrates on a single candidate, are realistic. Especially 
for party-based elections this appears unlikely (unless some parties do not contest all seats). 
We propose a natural extension of the definition of wasted votes for fully-contested (see 
below) elections, enabling our formula to be expressed in the language of equality of the 
number of wasted votes. First, we note that for such equality to be satisfied, each relevant 
party needs to obtain certain minimum share of votes35. We call that minimum share the 
threshold of relevancy (𝑡), where 𝑡 ∈ (0,1). We shall later show that this threshold must 
coincide with the natural threshold defined in Sec. 3.3. Second, we consider an election to be 
fully contested if each party 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛 obtains at least 𝑡𝑣𝑘 votes in every district 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑐, 
where 𝑣𝑘 is the total number of votes cast for relevant parties in the 𝑘-th district. Third, we 
follow McGhee’s intuition that the wasted votes should be defined for the winner as the 
surplus votes over the number of votes ensuring the victory and for the losers as all the votes 
casted. Let 𝑊 ∈ (0,1) be the threshold above which the victory is ensured. It is clear now, 
that it should be defined not as half of all the votes, but only as half of the 1 − 𝑛𝑡 
redistributable votes plus 𝑡, i.e., 
𝑊 ∶= (1 − 𝑛𝑡) 2⁄ + 𝑡. (4.9) 
Formally, we define the number of wasted votes for the 𝑖-th (𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛) party in the 𝑘-th 
(𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑐) district as 
𝑤𝑖
𝑘 ∶= �𝑣𝑖𝑘 −𝑊𝑣𝑘, where 𝑠𝑖𝑘 = 1
𝑣𝑖
𝑘, where 𝑠𝑖𝑘 = 0    =  𝑣𝑖𝑘 −𝑊𝑣𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑘. (4.10) 
To avoid the number of wasted votes being negative, we assume that the winning party’s vote 
share equals or exceeds 𝑊 in each district. 
Moreover, we shall assume that district size (the total number of votes cast for relevant 
parties) is not correlated with electoral victory for any party, i.e., 1
𝑐
�𝑣𝑘𝑠𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= 1
𝑐
�𝑣𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
∙
1
𝑐
�𝑠𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
 
or equivalently 
                                                 
35 For instance, it is easy to observe that if one party has zero votes (and necessarily zero wasted votes), the 
efficiency gap criterion can never be satisfied. 
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�𝑣𝑘𝑠𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= 𝑣𝑠𝑖 𝑐⁄  (4.11) 
for each 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛 (note that, as in the two-party case, this is a relaxed version of the 
McGhee-Stephanopoulos assumption that district size is constant). 
Within each district, the number of wasted votes sums up to 
�𝑤𝑖
𝑘
𝑛
𝑖=1
= ��𝑣𝑖𝑘 −𝑊𝑣𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑘�𝑛
𝑖=1
= �𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑛
𝑖=1
−𝑊𝑣𝑘�𝑠𝑖
𝑘
𝑛
𝑖=1
= (1 −𝑊)𝑣𝑘. (4.12)  
Thus, the nationwide sum of wasted votes equals 
�(1 −𝑊)𝑣𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1
= (1 −𝑊)𝑣. (4.13) 
If each of the 𝑛 parties is to have equal number of wasted votes (per the efficiency gap 
criterion), it follows that 
�𝑤𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= (1 −𝑊) 𝑣
𝑛
 (4.14) 
must hold for each 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛. Applying (4.11) and (4.12) we get 
�𝑤𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= ��𝑣𝑖𝑘 −𝑊𝑣𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑘�𝑐
𝑘=1
= 𝑣𝑖 −𝑊𝑣𝑠𝑖 𝑐⁄ = 𝑣(𝑝𝑖 −𝑊𝑞𝑖). (4.15)  
Now (4.14) and (4.15) imply (1 −𝑊) 𝑛⁄ = 𝑝𝑖 −𝑊𝑞𝑖 . (4.16) 
Hence 𝑝𝑖 > (1 −𝑊) 𝑛⁄ . Accordingly, we obtain the formula for the threshold of relevancy 
𝑡 ≔ (1 −𝑊) 𝑛⁄ . (4.17) 
Now, if we substitute (4.17) into (4.9), we obtain 𝑊 = 𝑊 2⁄ + 𝑡, and so 𝑡 = 𝑊/2. 
Accordingly, 
𝑊 = 1 − 𝑛𝑊 2⁄2 + 𝑊2 = 22 + 𝑛 = 11 + 𝑛/2 , (4.18) 
and 
𝑡 = 12 + 𝑛 . (4.19) 
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Note that 𝑊 is our optimal divisor defined in Sec. 3.1 and 𝑡 is our natural threshold 
introduced in Sec. 3.3. Accordingly, the definitions of relevancy given in Sec. 3.3 and in this 
section coincide. Now substituting (4.18) into (4.15) we have 
𝑣 �𝑝𝑖 −
22 + 𝑛 𝑞𝑖� = 𝑣𝑛 �1 − 22 + 𝑛�. (4.20) 
This gives 
𝑞𝑖 = (1 + 𝑛 2⁄ )𝑝𝑖 − 1/2, (4.21) 
which is exactly our formula (0.2) for single-seat (𝑚 = 1) districts. Conversely, assuming 
(4.21) we shall get (4.22), so both approaches coincide. 
Accordingly, it follows that under the definition of wasted votes given by (4.10) and the 
assumptions stated above, viz. 
(1) that all districts are fully contested, i.e., 𝑝𝑖𝑘 > 𝑡 for each relevant party 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛 and 
for every district 𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑛, 
(2) that wasted votes are always nonnegative, i.e., that the winner in every district obtains 
a vote share equal to or in excess of 𝑊, 
(3) that district size is not correlated with electoral victory for any party, 
the only values of 𝑊 and 𝑡 that lead to the efficiency gap criterion being capable of 
satisfaction are those that result from our formula, i.e., 𝑊 = 2 (2 + 𝑛)⁄  and 𝑡 = 1 (2 + 𝑛)⁄ . 
Note also that in such case, assumptions (1) and (2) above imply our assumption A4 (but not 
vice versa – we do not require assumption (1) for our formula to work), assumption (3) is 
related to our A2, and the efficiency gap criterion becomes equivalent to our A5. 
4.4. Application of power law to modeling the Jefferson-D’Hondt seat allocation method 
Scholars have usually considered the relationship between seat ratios and vote ratios in FPTP 
electoral systems in terms of the power law. Cube law – the original form of the power law – 
has been first proposed in 1909 (Hearings before the Royal Commission on Systems of 
Election 1909: 77-86) by James Parker Smith (who attributed it to a British mathematician 
P. A. MacMahon36). 
Proposition (“the cube law”). Let us pick any of the two parties and denote its vote share as 
𝑝 and its seat share as 𝑞. It follows that the other party’s vote share equals 1 − 𝑝 and its seat 
share equals 1 − 𝑞. It claimed that in a two-party system with FPTP the seat ratio would be a 
cube of the vote ratio, i.e. that 
𝑞1 − 𝑞 = � 𝑝1 − 𝑝�3. (4.23) 
Since the first seminal work by Kendall and Stuart (1950), both the theoretical underpinnings 
and empirical correctness of the cube law have been extensively studied; see, inter alia, works 
by Butler (1952), March (1957), Coleman (1964), Qualter (1968), Theil (1970), Taagepera 
                                                 
36 On MacMahon’s role in the development of the cube law, see Garcia (2006). 
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(1973), Quandt (1974), Gudgin and Taylor (1979), Stanton (1980), Gilliland (1985), 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Blais and Massicotte (1996), Maloney, Pearson and Pickering 
(2003), Dolez and Laurent (2005) and others. Taagepera (1973), Tufte (1973) and Linehan 
and Schrodt (1977) appear to have been the first to propose a more general power law, where 
the exponent in (4.23) – instead of being fixed at 3 – becomes an exogenous parameter 
permitted to vary within [1,∞), i.e. 
𝑞1 − 𝑞 = � 𝑝1 − 𝑝�𝛽 . (4.24) 
Attempts to fit such more general models led to findings of exponents within the (2, 2.5) 
interval for the United States (Tufte, 1973, Gudgin and Taylor, 1979: 29, Schrodt, 1981, 
Gryski, Reed and Elliott, 1990), New Zealand (Tufte, 1973), South Africa (Schrodt, 1981) and 
even Great Britain (Laakso, 1979, Blau, 2004). Theoretical arguments in favor of square 
(rather than cube) law have been made by Sankoff and Mellos (1972), who relied on game 
theoretic approach, and Maloney, Pearson and Pickering (2003), who argued that Taagepera’s 
(1973) original assumptions on fractal character of electoral geography should produce 
“√3-law” rather than cube law. 
A seat ratio under our formula can be obtained from (4.4): 
𝑞1 − 𝑞 = 𝑝 − 1/43/4 − 𝑝. (4.25) 
The relationship between this ratio and the votes ratio 𝑝 (1 − 𝑝)⁄  can also be described by a 
power law, but with the exponent itself being a function of 𝑝: 
𝛽(𝑝) = �ln 𝑞1 − 𝑞� �ln 𝑝1 − 𝑝�� = �ln 4𝑝 − 13 − 4𝑝� �ln 𝑝1 − 𝑝�� . (4.26) 
We plot that function on Fig. 10 below. 
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Fig. 10. Power law exponent as a function of party’s vote share in single-seat districts. 
We note that, except in extreme cases when the stronger party wins more than two thirds of 
the vote, the exponent falls exactly within the interval indicated by “square-plus law” findings 
cited above (and as the votes ratio tends to 1, the exponent tends to 2). Assuming that the vote 
share of the stronger party is uniformly distributed on (1/2, 3/4), the expected value of 𝛽 
equals approximately 2.38. 
Of course, the above model can be generalized to any district magnitude, as long as there are 
still only two parties. For arbitrary 𝑚 ∈ [1,∞) the seats ratio formula is 
𝑞1 − 𝑞 = 𝑝 − 12𝑚 + 21 − 𝑝 − 12𝑚 + 2𝑚, (4.27) 
and the function 
𝛽(𝑝) = ln(𝑝(𝑚 + 1) − 1/2) − ln(𝑚− 𝑝(𝑚 + 1) + 1/2)ln 𝑝1 − 𝑝  (4.28) 
for 𝑚 = 1,2,3,4,12 is plotted on Fig. 11 below. 
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Fig. 11. Power law exponent as a function of party’s vote share in multiple-seat districts (𝒎 = 𝟏,𝟐,𝟑,𝟒,𝟏𝟐). 
Two properties of this function are of particular interest: its limit as 𝑝 approaches 1/2 and the 
expected value throughout its natural domain. The former can be calculated by applying de 
L'Hôpital's rule: 
lim
𝑝→1/2 𝛽(𝑝) = lim𝑝→1/2  𝜕𝜕𝑝 ln 𝑝(𝑚 + 1) − 1/2𝑚 − 𝑝(𝑚 + 1) + 1/2lim
𝑝→1/2  𝜕𝜕𝑝 ln 𝑝1 − 𝑝 = 1 + 1𝑚, (4.29) 
while expected 𝛽 equals 
E(𝛽) = � ln 𝑝(𝑚 + 1) − 1/2𝑚 − 𝑝(𝑚 + 1) + 1/2ln 𝑝1 − 𝑝  𝑓(𝑝) 𝑑𝑝
2𝑚+1
2𝑚+2
1
2𝑚+2
, (4.30) 
where 𝑓 is the probability density of 𝑝. 
It is interesting to see how the limiting exponent (4.29) and the expected exponent (4.30) 
compare with the leading model of seats-votes relationship in multi-seat districts – Rein 
Taagepera’s generalized cube law for proportional elections (Taagepera 1986). Taagepera 
proposed a fixed power law exponent (i.e., one invariant with respect to 𝑝) equal to 31 𝑚⁄ .  
The relationship between the three for realistic district magnitudes (𝑚 ∈ {1, … , 30}) is plotted 
as Fig. 12 below. 
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Fig. 12. Expected values (blue) and limiting values at ½ (green) of power law exponents under (6.20) plotted against 
exponents expected under Taagepera’s generalized cube law for proportional elections (orange). Expected values are 
computed under the assumption that vote shares are uniformly distributed. 
Of special note is the rapid convergence of Taagepera’s generalized cube law exponent 
�31 𝑚⁄ � and our limiting exponent (1 + 1/𝑚). This is however easily explained when one 
notes that for large values of 𝑠 
1 + 1
𝑚
= ��1 + 1
𝑚
�
𝑚
�
1/𝑚
≈ 𝑒1/𝑚, (4.31) 
which differs from Taagepera’s formula only as to base. While empirical test of the 
generalized e law versus the generalized cube law is beyond the scope of this article, we 
submit that at least on theoretical grounds there are sound arguments to expect e law to hold 
for multiple-seat districts. 
Conclusions 
As noted above, the seat allocation and seat bias formulae presented in this article have 
a number of both practical and theoretical applications. First, the seat allocation formula 
facilitates easy translation of vote shares into seat numbers, which constitute a natural 
complement of opinion and exit poll results. In such cases, aggregate national vote shares are 
usually all that is known. Their disaggregation into district-level results can only be done with 
complex and volatile election demographic models. In addition, such models are especially 
unreliable for new parties, whose territorial support patterns cannot be inferred from earlier 
elections. Our proposed formula provides a simpler alternative that relies only on aggregate 
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results and on the numbers of seats and districts, which are known before the election, and yet 
still provides a high degree of accuracy. 
Second, the seat allocation and seat bias formulae enable researchers and practitioners alike to 
simulate counterfactual election results without relying on restrictive assumptions with regard 
to the territorial distribution of party votes. This makes it a useful tool for evaluating political 
strategies and what-if scenarios and for assessing the effects of electoral engineering. The 
formula can be used to quantify for each party the expected costs and benefits of electoral 
reforms that involve changes in the mean district magnitude to a greater degree of precision 
than with earlier approaches. Such predictions were presented by one of the authors of this 
article during the 2017 public debate on changing the local and regional electoral system in 
Poland, contributing to the governing majority’s decision to withdraw the controversial 
proposals to shrink the electoral districts. 
Thirdly, the article explains how and why the seat bias under the Jefferson-D’Hondt method 
depends on both the mean district magnitude and the number of parties. While the former 
relationship – captured by the micromega rule – is well known to students of electoral 
systems, the latter has been somewhat underappreciated beyond the field of purely theoretical 
studies of election bias. We demonstrate how, and under what conditions, those two strands of 
electoral system research can be combined into a complete picture of the conditions 
determining the magnitude of the seat bias. 
Finally, our formula, generalizing the McGhee-Stephanopoulos efficiency gap approach, 
provides a consistent normative criterion for lack of ‘skewness’ in the Jefferson-D’Hondt 
variant of proportional voting system. An election the results of which deviate significantly 
from the formula must be in a sense ‘skewed,’ either as a result of some unnatural correlations 
possibly, though not necessarily, caused by malapportionment or gerrymandering, or due to 
some random numerical artefacts of the system. 
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Appendix A. The relationship between errors and assumptions 
As noted in Sec. 1.2 and explained in detail in Sec. 3.2, the seat allocation and seat bias 
formulae produce exact results if assumptions A1 to A5 hold exactly. Any deviation from 
those assumptions introduces errors. The key to the formula’s robustness, however, lies in the 
fact that those errors tend to cancel each other out. 
There are, broadly speaking, three principal sources of error in the seat allocation formula. 
First, there is an error resulting from violations of assumption A1, i.e., allocation of some 
seats to parties that fall below the mean natural threshold. Because we eliminate those parties 
from the set of relevant parties, those seats get misallocated even on the district level under 
formula (3.1) (which is otherwise exactly correct in all cases). The number of such 
misallocated seats is a natural measure of this kind of error (we will denote it as 𝜀1). 
Second, there is an error arising from the summation procedure described in Sec. 3.2. 
Analyzing this procedure, we see that for the 𝑖-th party (𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛) the error can be written 
as the sum of three components: 
𝜀2𝑎
𝑖 ∶= 𝑝𝑖𝑠 −�𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑣𝑘 𝑠𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1
= ��𝑝𝑖𝑚 − 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑣𝑘 𝑠𝑘�𝑐
𝑘=1
, (5.1) 
𝜀2𝑏
𝑖 ∶= 𝑝𝑖 𝑐𝑛2 −�𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑣𝑘�𝑟𝑗𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑐
𝑘=1
= ��𝑝𝑖𝑛2 − 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑣𝑘�𝑟𝑗𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1
�
𝑐
𝑘=1
, (5.2) 
and  
𝜀2𝑐
𝑖 ∶= 𝑐2 −�𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑐
𝑘=1
= ��12 − 𝑟𝑖𝑘�𝑐
𝑘=1
. (5.3) 
It follows from Sec. 3.2 that 𝜀2𝑎𝑖  accounts for violations of combined assumptions A2 and A3, 
𝜀2𝑏
𝑖  – for those of combined assumptions A2 and A4, and 𝜀2𝑐𝑖  – for those of assumption A5. 
Finally, for countries where the regional correction is employed there exists a third source of 
potential error, involving violations of one or more of the three assumptions underlying that 
correction (R1, R2, and R3). For national parties such an error equals 
𝜀3𝑁
𝑖 ∶= ��𝑠𝑘 + 𝑐𝑘(|𝑁| + |𝑅𝑘|)2 ��𝑃𝑖 1 −∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑗∈𝑅𝑟1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑗∈𝑅 − 𝑣𝑖𝑘𝑣𝑘�𝑟𝑘=1 , (5.4) 
where 𝑟 is the number of regions, 𝑁 – the set of all national parties, 𝑅 – the set of all regional 
parties, and 𝑅𝑘 – the set of regional parties running in the 𝑘–th region, while for regional 
parties running in region 𝑘 the error introduced by the regional correction equals simply 
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𝜀3𝑅
𝑖 ∶= 𝑃𝑖 �𝑠𝑘 + 𝑐𝑘(|𝑁| + |𝑅𝑘|)2 � � 𝑠𝑠𝑘 − 𝑃𝑃𝑘�. (5.5) 
Note that the above enumeration of error sources is exhaustive, i.e., those sources account for 
all actual errors in the formula. In other words, comparing – for every case under 
consideration – the sum of 𝜀1, 𝜀2𝑎, 𝜀2𝑏 and 𝜀2𝑐 over all regions and of 𝜀3 – the regional error – 
with the deviation of the estimated seat allocation from the actual seat allocation, the 
difference between the two is zero. 
For each kind of error we plot a kernel density estimate (a histogram for 𝜀1, which is discrete). 
We normalize all error measures by dividing them by national seat totals. 
 
 Fig. 13. Histogram of errors (𝜺𝟏) arising from the violations of A1. 
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Fig. 14. Density of errors arising from the violations of A2 and A3 (ࢿ૛ࢇ࢏  – upper left), of A2 and A4 (ࢿ૛࢈࢏  – upper right), 
and A5 (ࢿ૛ࢉ࢏  – lower left), and of the assumptions underlying the regional correction (ࢿ૜ – lower right). 
Figs. 13 and 14 illustrate the fact that assumption A5 (that the rounding residuals average 1/2 
for each relevant party) is responsible for the largest number of errors in its application. The 
errors generated by violations of the other four assumptions are surprisingly few in number. 
We are also interested in the interaction between the five sources of errors, and particularly in 
correlations between them. They are described by the following correlation matrix: 
ߝଵ  ߝଶ௔  ߝଶ௕  ߝଶ௖  ߝଷ 
ߝଵ 1.0000 0.0002 0.0832 0.0253 0.0504 ߝଶ௔  0.0002 1.0000 0.6717 ‐0.1410 0.4561 ߝଶ௕  0.0832 0.6717 1.0000 ‐0.1666 0.5316 ߝଶ௖  0.0253 ‐0.1410 ‐0.1666 1.0000 ‐0.1017 ߝଷ 0.0504 0.4561 0.5316 ‐0.1017 1.0000 
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It appears that error 𝜀1 is very weakly correlated with others. On the other hand, errors 𝜀2𝑎, 
𝜀2𝑏, and 𝜀3 are strongly positively correlated and reinforce each other, but each of them is also 
negatively correlated with the largest source of error – 𝜀2𝑐 – so when summed up, they tend to 
cancel one another. 
Appendix B. Discussion of assumption A5 
Assumption A5 may prima facie appear arbitrary and restrictive. It can be shown, however, 
that under reasonable distributional assumptions we can expect it to be well-satisfied. A5 can 
be expressed as 1
𝑐
� 𝑟𝑖
𝑘
𝑐
𝑘=1
= 12 , (6.1) 
for any party 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛. Assuming that both the vote shares of the 𝑖-th party in given 
districts and those districts’ magnitudes are independent and identically distributed (for 
𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑐) random variables, one can deduce from the law of large numbers that the equality 
(6.1) is at least approximately fulfilled, providing that the expected value of 𝑟𝑖𝑘 equals 1/2. 
Let us assume that the 𝑖-th party’s vote share 𝑝𝑖  has an absolutely continuous distribution on [0,1]  with the density 𝑓𝑖 and the cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝑖. Moreover, let 𝑔 be the 
probability mass function of the distribution of district magnitudes. Let us assume that for 
every party 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛: 
• 𝑓𝑖 is smooth (of class 𝐶3) on [0,1] (A6), 
• 𝑓𝑖(0) = 𝑓𝑖(⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄ ) = 0 (A7), 
• 𝐹𝑖(⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄ ) = 1 (A8). 
It should be noted that those assumptions are only mildly restrictive. A6 can be freely 
assumed, since a smooth density function can always be fitted to a finite set of empirical data 
points. A7 and A8 follow from the fact that in real-life elections extreme vote shares arise 
only infrequently – in the eight countries analyzed in Sec. 2 such an occurrence has happened 
only in 9 out of 6 358 cases40 and, in fact, 5 of them has occurred in uncontested districts. 
For given 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑐 put 𝜇 ≔ 𝑠𝑘 and 𝑀 ∶= 𝑀𝑘 = 𝜇 + 𝑛 2⁄ . By A4 the conditional 
distribution of 𝑟𝑖𝑘 given the district magnitude being equal to 𝜇 = 1, 2, … is given by a density 
function 
1
𝑀
�𝑓𝑖 �
𝑙 + 𝑥
𝑀
�
⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=0
, (6.2) 
for 𝑥 ∈ [0,1]. Accordingly, the unconditional density of 𝑟𝑖𝑘 is given by 
                                                 
40 Four of those cases occurred in the Aland Islands (where all four elections represented in our data set have 
been uncontested), two in Croatian expatriate district (elections of 2011 and 2015), two in Portuguese expatriate 
district (elections of 1979 and 1980), and one in Mozambique (which, as a Portuguese colony, elected one deputy 
in the Portuguese election of 1975). Note also that all districts involved have been rather small in terms of the 
district magnitude: five of them have been single-member districts and none was larger than three seats. 
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�𝑔(𝜇) 1
𝑀
�𝑓𝑖 �
𝑙 + 𝑥
𝑀
�
⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=0
∞
𝜇=1
, (6.3) 
for 𝑥 ∈ [0,1], and its expected value equals 
E�𝑟𝑖𝑘� = � � 𝑥𝑀�𝑔(𝜇)𝑓𝑖 �𝑙 + 𝑥𝑀 �⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=0
∞
𝜇=1
 𝑑𝑥1
0
. (6.4) 
Let us substitute 𝑦 ∶= (𝑙 + 𝑥)/𝑀 and exchange integration and summation to obtain 
E�𝑟𝑖𝑘� = ��� 𝑀𝑦 − 𝑙𝑀 𝑔(𝜇)𝑓𝑖(𝑦)𝑀 𝑑𝑦
𝑙+1
𝑀
𝑙
𝑀
⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=0
∞
𝜇=1
= 
��� 𝑀𝑦 𝑔(𝜇)𝑓𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦𝑙+1𝑀
𝑙
𝑀
⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=0
∞
𝜇=1
−��� 𝑙𝑔(𝜇)𝑓𝑖(𝑦) 𝑑𝑦𝑙+1𝑀
𝑙
𝑀
⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=0
∞
𝜇=1
= 
E(𝑀)E(𝑝𝑖) −��𝑙𝑔(𝜇)�𝐹𝑖 �𝑙 + 1𝑀 � − 𝐹𝑖 � 𝑙𝑀��⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=0
∞
𝜇=1
= 
E(𝑀)E(𝑝𝑖) −�𝑔(𝜇)�⌊𝑀⌋𝐹𝑖 �⌊𝑀⌋ + 1𝑀 � −�𝐹𝑖 � 𝑙𝑀�⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=0 �
∞
𝜇=1 =  
E(𝑀)E(𝑝𝑖) − E(⌊𝑀⌋) + �𝑔(𝜇)�𝐹𝑖 � 𝑙𝑀�⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=0
∞
𝜇=1 . (6.5) 
Put Φ𝑖(𝑙) ∶= 𝐹𝑖(𝑙 𝑀⁄ ) for 0 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑀. From the Euler-Maclaurin summation formula it 
follows that for Φ𝑖 smooth enough (of class 𝐶𝜌+2) we have 
�Φ𝑖(𝑙)⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=1
= � Φ𝑖(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥⌊𝑀⌋
0
+ Φ𝑖(⌊𝑀⌋) + Φ𝑖(0)2
+ � 𝐵2𝑗(2𝑗)! �Φ𝑖(2𝑗−1)(⌊𝑀⌋) −Φ𝑖(2𝑗−1)(0)�𝜌/2
𝑗=1
+ 𝑅𝜌 , (6.6) 
where 𝜌 is an even natural number, 𝐵2𝑗 is the (2𝑗)-th Bernoulli number (for 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝜌/2), 
Φ𝑖
(𝐾) is the 𝐾-th derivative of Φ𝑖, and  
~ 51 ~ 
 
�𝑅𝜌� ≤
2𝜁(𝜌)(2𝜋)𝜌 � �Φ𝑖(𝜌)(𝑥)� 𝑑𝑥⌊𝑀⌋0 , (6.7) 
where 𝜁 is the Riemann zeta function. Let us note that 
� Φ𝑖(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥⌊𝑀⌋
0
= 𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄
0
= 𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦1
0
− 𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦1
⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄
, (6.8) 
Φ𝑖(⌊𝑀⌋) + Φ𝑖(0)2 = 𝐹𝑖(⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄ )2 , (6.9) 
Φ𝑖
(𝐾)(𝑥) = 𝑀−𝐾 𝐹𝑖(𝐾)(𝑥 𝑀⁄ ), (6.10) 
�𝑅𝜌� ≤
2𝜁(𝜌)(2𝜋)𝜌 � �Φ𝑖(𝜌)(𝑥)� 𝑑𝑥⌊𝑀⌋0 = 2𝑀𝜁(𝜌)(2𝜋𝑀)𝜌 � �𝐹𝑖(𝜌)(𝑦)�𝑑𝑦⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄0 . (6.11) 
Combining (6.6) with (6.8)-(6.11), we get for 𝜌 = 2 
�Φ𝑖(𝑙)⌊𝑀⌋
𝑙=1
= 𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦1
0
− 𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦1
⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄
+ 𝐹𝑖 �⌊𝑀⌋𝑀 �2 + 𝑓𝑖 �⌊𝑀⌋𝑀 � − 𝑓𝑖(0)12𝑀 + 𝑅2, (6.12) 
and 
|𝑅2| ≤ 2𝑀𝜁(2)(2𝜋𝑀)2 � �𝐹𝑖(2)(𝑦)�𝑑𝑦⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄0 = 112𝑀� �𝑓𝑖′(𝑦)�𝑑𝑦⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄0 . (6.13) 
From A7 we get 
𝑓𝑖(⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄ ) − 𝑓𝑖(0) = 0. (6.14) 
Note also that if 𝑛 is even, and so ⌊𝑀⌋ = 𝑀, then 
𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦1
⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄
= 0, (6.15) 
and accordingly 
𝐹𝑖(⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄ ) 2⁄ −𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦1
⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄
= 𝐹𝑖(1) 2⁄ = 1/2, (6.16) 
while if 𝑛 is odd, and so ⌊𝑀⌋ = 𝑀 − 1 2⁄ , then by A8 we obtain 
𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦1
⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄
= 𝐹𝑖(⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄ )/2, (6.17) 
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and accordingly 
𝐹𝑖(⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄ )2 −𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦1⌊𝑀⌋ 𝑀⁄ = 0. (6.18) 
By incorporating the foregoing results into (6.5) we obtain for even values of 𝑛: 
E�𝑟𝑖𝑘� = E(𝑀)E�𝑝𝑖� − E(⌊𝑀⌋) + � 12𝑔(𝜇)∞
𝜇=1 + �𝑔(𝜇)𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦10∞𝜇=1 + �𝑔(𝜇)𝑅2∞𝜇=1 = E(𝑀)E(𝑝𝑖) − E(𝑀) + E(𝑀)�1 − E(𝑝𝑖)� + 12 + �𝑔(𝜇)𝑅2∞
𝜇=1
=  
12 + �𝑔(𝜇)𝑅2∞
𝜇=1
, (6.19) 
and for odd values of 𝑛: 
E�𝑟𝑖𝑘� = E(𝑀)E�𝑝𝑖� − E(⌊𝑀⌋) + �𝑔(𝜇)𝑀� 𝐹𝑖(𝑦)𝑑𝑦1
0
∞
𝜇=1 + �𝑔(𝜇)𝑅2∞𝜇=1 = E(𝑀)E(𝑝𝑖) − E(𝑀− 1/2) − E(𝑀)�1 − E(𝑝𝑖)� + �𝑔(𝜇)𝑅2∞
𝜇=1
=  
12 + �𝑔(𝜇)𝑅2∞
𝜇=1
. (6.20) 
Note that the right-hand sides of (6.19) and (6.20) are identical, so the parity of 𝑛 has no effect 
on the expected value of 𝑟𝑖𝑘. Finally, we get 
�E�𝑟𝑖𝑘� − 12� ≤�𝑔(𝜇)𝑅2∞
𝜇=1
= E� 112𝑀� �𝑓𝑖′(𝑦)� 𝑑𝑦⌊𝑀⌋𝑀0 � = E�𝑀−1�12 � �𝑓𝑖′(𝑦)� 𝑑𝑦10 , (6.21) 
where ∫ �𝑓𝑖
′(𝑦)�𝑑𝑦1
0
 is simply the total variation of 𝑓𝑖. For unimodal distributions, it equals 2𝑓𝑖(𝜑𝑖), where 𝜑𝑖 is the mode of 𝑓𝑖. 
Hence, if the number of relevant parties or the district magnitudes are large enough, then the 
expected reciprocal of the unbiased multiplier 𝑀 = 𝜇 + 𝑛 2⁄  is small, and so E�𝑟𝑖𝑘� are 
approximately equal to 1 2⁄  for 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛 and 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑐. When the number of districts 𝑐 is 
large, it further follows from the law of large numbers that means (1 𝑐⁄ )∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑘=1  (𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛) 
are close to the expected values, thereby approximately satisfying assumption A5. 
 
